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The capacity of Indian tribal sovereignty to protect tribes from outside 
encroachment and interference has steadily diminished from when the 
concept was first enunciated in the nineteenth century in the Marshall 
Indian Law Trilogy.  This article assumes as a working premise that only 
bringing tribes into the Constitution as co-equal sovereigns will end the 
attrition.  The article examines how this might happen, either through 
creative interpretation of existing constitutional text or by amending the 
Constitution.  Each of these proposals is examined to see if it empowers 
tribes to manage their futures more effectively, is capacious enough to 
include the vast majority of tribes, maintains the union’s security and 
stability, and has political salience.  The article concludes that only the 
creation of a virtual nationwide election district for all members of a tribe to 
elect tribal representatives to Congress will meet these criteria.  The author 
concedes that the approach is novel, but hopes it is sufficiently viable to 
warrant further consideration by others. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
To have or to claim particular rights—that is to be a political 
subject of any kind is necessarily to inhabit particular forms of 
imagined or achieved—even if unstable or contested—political 
space.1 
This is an article about constitutional federalism and not about Indian 
tribes.  It uses the semi-autonomous sovereign status of Indian tribes to 
examine whether the current federal structure, which is based on the 
premise of only two sovereigns, is sufficiently porous to absorb tribes as a 
third, co-equal sovereign.2  “[W]hile a few native nations have become real 
players in the larger American political and economic systems, most tribal 
rights are based on pillars made not of constitutional granite, but of treaty 
and trust-soaked sand which can be washed away at the whim of lawmakers 
or judicial activists.”3 
As a result of misguided policies, many Indians are among the poorest 
of the poor4 without political, social, or economic power to improve their 
lot.  American tribes suffer from a lack of power to protect themselves from 
the rivalrous desires of non-Indians; at most, they function like weak 
lobbying groups struggling to have their views represented in Congress 
 
* Hope Babcock is a professor at Georgetown University Law Center where she teaches 
environmental and natural resources law.  In her clinical practice, she and her students have 
represented Indian tribes and tribal members on environmental concerns.  This article grew out of 
her previous scholarship on Indian sovereignty and federalism.  She is grateful for Georgetown’s 
continuing support and funding of her scholarship. 
1.  Thomas Biolsi, Imagined Geographies: Sovereignty, Indigenous Space, and American 
Indian Struggle, 32 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 239, 253 (2005). 
2.  What is paradoxical about the situation of U.S. tribes is that they have already achieved 
what aboriginal communities in countries like Australia, New Zealand, and Canada  
want—”[T]ribal sovereignty within a Native homeland (a modern tribal government with its tribal 
citizenry on its reservation).”  Id. at 240. 
3.  DAVID E. WILKINS & HEIDI KIIWETINEPINESIIK STARK, AMERICAN INDIAN POLITICS 
AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 233 (2011).  But see Jonathan Martin, G.O.P. Hopeful 
Finds Tribal Tie Cuts Both Ways, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2014, 
http://www nytimes.com/2014/05/04/us/politics/gop-hopeful-finds-tribal-tie-cuts-both-
ways html?_r=0 (describing the Chickasaw Nation as one of the most influential tribes in 
Oklahoma, “a state where Native Americans are not merely the inheritors of a poignant history but 
also collectively constitute the state’s largest nongovernment employer outside of Walmart,” with 
the major source of those jobs being the state’s 110 casinos). 
4.  According to the Census Bureau, 29.1% of single-race American Indians and Alaska 
Natives lived in poverty.  This was the highest rate of any race group in the country.  The poverty 
rate for the entire country was 15.9%. American Fact Finder, CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://factfinder2.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/ACS/12_1YR/S0201//popgroup~002|004|006|009|
012.  
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against the views of those who would do them harm, including the states.5 
A working assumption of this article is that this story will not change unless 
the root of that powerlessness—the tribes’ position outside our 
constitutional structure of governance—is transformed somehow.6  Yet 
doing that is not easy. 
Indian tribes pose a unique federalism problem, functioning like a 
“federalism football.”7  They were “excluded from the original  
compact”—an exclusion that tends to be reproduced and reinforced by the 
specific dynamics of federal governance.8  Indeed, “federalism operates as a 
gridlock that limits the possibilities for significant institutional reforms that 
would respond to Indigenous claims for proper recognition of their 
jurisdictional authority.”9  To the extent that “federalism has evolved in 
light of Indigenous autonomy demands,” this evolution “is largely taking 
place at the margins of the federal system, through processes of governance 
that are layered over, and often in tension with, the formal division of 
 
5.  Martin Papillon, Adapting Federalism:  Indigenous Peoples and Multilevel Government 
in Canada and U.S., (draft paper) (manuscript at 10) (in possession of author). See also id. at 15 
(commenting that American tribes “face a more fragmented political system in which they seem 
condemned to engage in electoral politics and lobbying-type activities not only at the federal level 
but also at the state level,” in contrast to Canada, where tribes can “contain the process at the level 
of executive, government-to-government negotiations.”)  In the negotiation process, because they 
are outside the mainstream political process, Papillon concludes, it is “easier for [Canadian] 
Indigenous governments to consolidate their status as representatives of distinct political 
communities.”  Id.  But see Henry Gass, Could American Indians decide the Senate majority? 
ENV’T & ENERGY DAILY, April 9, 2014, http://www.eenews net/eedaily/stories/1059997581/print 
(discussing the increasing political power of some tribes in Montana, South Dakota, and Alaska). 
6.  See Robert Ericson & D. Rebecca Snow, Comment, The Indian Battle for  
Self-Determination, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 445, 487 (1970) (“At first federal concern centered on the 
consolidation of federal power in the face of the Indians’ potential threat. The Indians can hardly 
be said to constitute a threat to national power any more, but this interest has been replaced by 
concern for the smooth running of the federal system. The Indians’ stake in this relationship is the 
preservation of as much of their original sovereignty as possible, since only with some residuum 
of resources and independent powers will they be able to participate actively and meaningfully 
shaping their own roles in national life. The Indians’ interest has remained unaltered over the 
years . . . .”).  See also Dario F. Robertson, Note, A New Constitutional Approach to the Doctrine 
of Tribal Sovereignty, 6 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 371, 387 (1978) (the tribal sovereignty doctrine “is 
in desperate need of a cogent theoretical infrastructure that can withstand systemic political 
pressures and attitudinal bias”). 
7.  Carol Tebben, An American Trifederalism Based upon the Constitutional Status of Tribal 
Nations, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 318, 330 (2003). 
8.  Papillon, supra note, 5, at 1.  For a contrary view of the role Indians played in the framing 
of the Constitution, see Gregory Ablavsky, The Savage Constitution, 63 DUKE L.J. 999, 1002 
(2014) (“the conquest and dispossession of Native peoples were integral to the Constitution’s 
ratification, shaping subsequent events”). 
9.  Papillon, supra note 5, at 2.  See also id.  (“The relatively rigid constitutional division of 
powers between federal and state/provincial legislatures creates an ‘institutional gridlock’ that 
limits the range of possible responses to Indigenous autonomy claims today.”). 
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powers and intergovernmental regimes” that exemplify U.S. federalism.10  
For some purposes tribes are recognized as sovereigns, albeit “domestic 
dependent nations;”11 for others, they are subject to the whim of Congress’s 
exercise of its plenary power over them or to the judiciary’s oscillating 
views of their legitimacy and competence.12  Until the late nineteenth 
century, tribes were treated as though they were foreign countries, and their 
members were excluded from citizenship under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.13  Today, Indian Country functions as “a series of semi-
 
10.  Id. 
11.  Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831).  See also Philip P. Frickey, (Native) 
American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 431, 438 (2005)  
(“Although ‘domestic dependent nation’ may sound more like oxymoron than a plausible legal 
concept, the Constitution supports viewing tribes as both domestic and sovereign, even if it does 
not clearly support the idea of dependence.”); Julie A. Clement, Comment, Strengthening 
Autonomy by Waiving Sovereign Immunity: Why Indian Tribes Should Be “Foreign” Under the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 14 T. M. COOLEY L. REV. 653, 653 (1997) (“‘Domestic 
dependent nation’ may be an oxymoron. ‘Nation,’ at the very least, implies independence rather 
than dependence; ‘domestic’ requires a connection to the United States that precludes being also 
labeled a ‘nation.’”); Sarah Krakoff, A Narrative of Sovereignty: Illuminating the Paradox of 
Domestic Dependent Nation, 83 OR. L. REV. 1109, 1195 (2004) (“The domestic legal status of 
tribes may be indefensible as a doctrinal and normative matter, but it is the present reality for 
tribes, and will remain so for the foreseeable future.”).  Frickey goes on to note: “Because tribal 
sovereignty is understood as being retained from a tribe’s inherent, preconstitutional sovereignty 
rather than consisting of delegated power, the exercise of this sovereignty does not entail any 
federal or state action that would trigger the Constitution.”  Frickey, supra note 11, at 440.  
12.  See Krakoff, supra note 11, at 1189-90 (“The framework of federal law is inescapable, 
yet federal law renders tribal sovereignty a fragile concept, resting vulnerably in the hands of 
potentially unconstrained federal courts that articulate a nebulous common law and legislators 
who exercise an insufficiently constrained plenary power.”).  Indeed, Frickey wonders how “the 
Court—not Congress with its supposed plenary power, not the executive branch with its authority 
over relations with other sovereigns—could even plausibly be understood as having an unchecked 
power to destroy governmental authority that preexists the founding of this country.”  Frickey, 
supra note 11, at 466.  Krakoff identifies the Court’s decisions depriving tribes of jurisdiction over 
non-members as the most damaging.  Krakoff, supra note 11, at 1195 (“The Supreme Court’s 
decisions that divest tribes of categories of jurisdiction over non-members are doing the most 
mischief.  In the case of the Navajo Nation, they threaten protections for on-reservation 
employment, inhibit the application of consumer and tort laws, create uncertainty for litigants in 
tribal court, inhibit the transactional environment, contribute to a chaotic and unpredictable 
administration of criminal laws, and decrease tax revenue.  Taken together these effects could well 
destabilize the Navajo Nation in ways that ultimately eat away at the vital yet delicate Navajo 
identity that has managed to persist, despite very long odds.”). 
13.  See Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884) (identifying naturalization as the only path to 
citizenship).  Tribes lost their non-citizen status when they lost the ability to enter into treaties 
with the federal government. Indian Appropriation Action of 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566 
(1871) (“no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged 
or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract 
by treaty . . . .”).  In 1924, Congress passed a law giving Indians citizenship whether it was desired 
or not. Citizenship to Indians Act of 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (1924).  See also Tebben, supra 
note 7, at 344 (discussing this statute and the ambiguity of whether Congress or the Fourteenth 
Amendment is the source of Indian citizenship); Franceis Abele and Michael J. Prince, Four 
Pathways to Aboriginal Self-Governance, 36 AM. REV. CANADIAN STUD. 568, 581 (2006) 
(making the same point with respect to Canadian aboriginal peoples, saying “Canadian citizenship 
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autonomous federal enclaves” within the boundaries of the states that host 
their reservations, an “ambiguous status” that has inevitably become “a 
recipe for enduring conflicts with states.”14 
Indians also pose a unique American societal problem because they 
destabilize much that would otherwise be uncontested in our culture if we 
could just ignore them.  They destabilize the myth of the United States’ 
founding,15 the assumed basis of property rights,16 and our cosmology and 
the central place of humans in it.17  The persistence of Indians and Indian 
tribes threaten the self-image of the American melting pot, where 
differences based on race, ethnicity, or color disappear.18 
We, in turn, have a long history of destabilizing Indians—we forcibly 
removed them from lands they had occupied for centuries;19 we re-formed 
and then continued to reconstitute them haphazardly on reservations20 
separating them from their traditional land base and from non-Indians; we 
robbed them of their language, rituals, and heritage by, among other things, 
removing Indian children from their families and putting them in white-run 
boarding schools; we limited their capacity to hold non-Indians accountable 
for crimes committed on Indian lands and against Indian peoples; we 
insisted that they replicate our governance structures and subject themselves 
 
is something that was eventually given to Aboriginal peoples, not something that they asked for, 
wanted, or even accepted.”). 
14.  Papillon, supra note 5, at 3. 
15.  See generally Hope M. Babcock, The Stories We Tell, and Have Told, About Tribal 
Sovereignty:  Legal Fictions at Their Most Pernicious, 55 VILL. L. REV.  803 (2010) (discussing 
the myths about Indian tribes that had their origins in the Marshall Indian Law Trilogy). 
16.  Ezra Rosser, The Ambition and Transformative Potential of Progressive Property, 101 
CALIF. L. REV. 107, 133 (2013) (“America’s real property came from dispossessing 
Indians . . . .”). See also Hope M. Babcock, Reserved Indian Water Rights in Riparian 
Jurisdictions:  Water, Water Everywhere, Perhaps Some Drops for Us, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1203 
(2006) (discussing the concept of reserved Indian water rights). 
17.  See generally Hope M. Babcock, “This I know from my Grandfather:” The Battle for 
Admissibility of Aboriginal Oral History as Proof of Tribal Land Claims, 37 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 
19 (2013). 
18.  WILKINS & KIIWETINEPINESIIK STARK, supra note 3, at 232 (Wilkins asks why this 
country has not “jettisoned these doctrines, values, and laws that are obviously rooted in 
prejudicial and racist discourse towards Indians, when much progress has been made in expunging 
similar discourse regarding African Americans, Asian Americans, women, and other groups.”). 
19.  See Rosser, supra note 16, at 131 (“History would record the subsequent Cherokee Trail 
of Tears, the Navajo Long Walk, the massacre at Wounded Knee, and the various legal and 
extralegal mechanisms through which Indian rights were denied and Indian land was taken.”). 
20.  Jeanne Guillemin, The Politics of National Integration:  A Comparison of United States 
and Canadian Indian Administrations, 25 SOC. PROBS. 319, 328 (1978) (“The reservation system 
originates from British colonial policy which was torn between democratic ideals and dogmatic 
racism.”).  
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to oversight if they wanted to enjoy the benefits of the Great Society;21 we 
took their identities and made popular cultural symbols of them;22 and we 
even tried at diverse times in our history to exterminate them.23  Adding 
insult to injury, at various points, perhaps out of a sense of collective 
guilt,24 we have romanticized Indians beyond all recognition.25  But despite 
 
21.  See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Redefining the Status of Indian Tribes Within “Our 
Federalism”:  Beyond the Dependency Paradigm, 38 CONN. L. REV. 667, 675 (2006) (“the Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA) represented the first comprehensive attempt at incorporating 
Indian tribes as political entities within the legal and political system of the United States.”) 
22.  See Naomi Mezey, The Paradoxes of Cultural Property, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 2004-46 
(2007) (discussing the appropriation of Indian names by sports teams). 
23.  See Zachary S. Price, Dividing Sovereignty in Tribal and Territorial Criminal 
Jurisdiction, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 657, 669 (2013) (“Native American relations with the United 
States have a tragic history.  Congress has, at various times, pursued policies aimed at the 
assimilation of tribal members and extinction of tribal cultural and political independence, to say 
nothing of historic efforts to expel or exterminate native peoples altogether.”).  See also 
Guillemin, supra note 20, at 319 (“The history of modern nationalism is replete with examples of 
state strategies for encouraging citizens to identify with the nation’s cultural heritage and its 
political ideals.  This same history is also full of instances where sub groups which might resist 
national allegiance were relegated to the margins of society, or in extreme cases, purged by exile 
or genocide.”).  L. Frank Baum, the author of The Wonderful World of Oz, penned the following 
editorial: 
The proud spirit of the original owners of these vast prairies inherited through 
centuries of fierce and bloody wars for their possession, lingered last in the 
bosom of Sitting Bull.  With his fall the nobility of the Redskin is extinguished, 
and what few are left are a pack of whining curs who lick the hand that smites 
them.  The Whites, by law of conquest, by justice of civilization, are masters of 
the American continent, and the best safety of the frontier settlements will be 
secured by the total annihilation of the few remaining Indians.  Why not 
annihilation?  Their glory has fled, their spirit broken, their manhood effaced; 
better that they die than live the miserable wretches that they are.  History would 
forget these latter despicable beings, and speak, in later ages of the glory of these 
grand Kings of forest and plain that Cooper loved to heroism.  We cannot 
honestly regret their extermination, but we at least do justice to the manly 
characteristics possessed, according to their lights and education, by the early 
Redskins of America. 
L. Frank Berry, Editorials on the Sioux Nation, ABERDEEN SATURDAY PIONEER, December 20, 
1890, 
hsmt history.ox.ac.uk//courses_reading/undergraduate/authority_of_nature/week_7/baum.pdf.  
24.  See Megan Basham, Unmasking Tonto:  Can Title VII “Make It” in Hollywood?, 37 
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 549, 557-58 (2013) (explaining that white people paint their faces black or 
red not only as a method of cultural hegemony, in which the dominant “class defines stereotypes 
as ‘common sense’ truths” but also as “a multifaceted way of psychologically processing the 
history of subjugation in the United States—a form of “apologetic catharsis”).  Basham notes that 
“often face painting was used mockingly, with overtly stereotypical and exaggerated prosthetic 
noses, lips, or eyes, and actors would perform with stereotypically exaggerated, ill-spoken 
behavior,” citing as an example of this Tonto’s “broken, pidgin English.”  Id.  at 555-56. 
25.  Babcock, supra note 15, at 809 n.33 (discussing the influence of James Fennimore 
Cooper).  See also Basham, supra note 24, at 559 (discussing the various stages of Hollywood’s 
portrayal of Indians, including their portrayal as “noble savages with mythic spiritual qualities”). 
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this, tribes and their members have endured as discreet centers of self-rule 
and cultural uniqueness.26 
The article’s starting premise is that Indian tribes, which are largely 
invisible in our constitutional configuration, must be made visible so that 
they can better protect their members and so the larger society can benefit 
from their unique contributions before what is different about tribes 
disappears.27  The article explores whether the concept of “Our Federalism” 
is sufficiently flexible to incorporate tribes as distinct sovereign entities, 
and whether doing that will benefit them.  The article rejects the idea that 
the “fix” for Indian tribes lies in reforming a particular branch of 
government or specific Indian policies, even though one or the other of 
those branches and their policies may have contributed to the sorry state of 
tribes today.  Instead, it focuses on whether changing our constitutional 
design to include Indian tribes as separate co-equal sovereigns would help 
them survive:  a goal Michael Dorris refers to as a “common denominator” 
of every Indian campaign since first contact with Europeans.28  Unless a 
separate but equal place in our constitutional structure for tribes is found, 
their current peripheral constitutional position will undermine their 
continued existence.  Even then, it is questionable as to whether at this late 
date tribes can survive as discrete centers of governance.29 
While giving Indian tribes the full range of constitutional protections 
and responsibilities makes them more like other governing bodies, it does 
not place them within the Constitution’s federalism structure nor take 
account of the fact that their existing governance structures and traditions 
 
26.  Krakoff, supra note 11, at 1194 (“Notwithstanding those policy periods, tribes as distinct 
political bodies have endured.  The disruptions and dislocations become a part of their culture, as 
well as something to attempt to redress politically.”). 
27.  See Michael A. Dorris, The Grass Still Grows, the Rivers Still Flow:  Contemporary 
Native Americans, 110 DAEDALUS 43, 62 (1981) (“historically, culturally, philosophically, 
legally, and in many other respects, tribes really are distinct, and it is in their unique qualities that 
their strengths and traditions reside.  Indians are not a single ethnic group and show no signs of 
becoming one.”) (emphasis added).  See also Tebben, supra note 7, at 321 (“A core underlying 
assumption of the three-sovereign framework is that constitutional inclusion, and a renewed 
judicial recognition of the constitutional status of tribal governments, have the potential to give 
greater protection to unique tribal cultures from continued dominance and interference.”). 
28.  Dorris, supra note 27, at 47 (“If nothing else, American Indians have been consistent in 
their objectives.  For the nearly five hundred years since continuous contact with the Eastern 
Hemisphere was established, simple survival has been the common denominator of every major 
tribal, national, or pan-Indian campaign vis-a-vis the first Europeans and their genetic or cultural 
descendants.”).  
29.  Robert A. Fairbanks, Native American Sovereignty and Treaty Rights:  Are They 
Historical Illusions?, 20 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 141, 149 (1996) (“Whether Native American 
peoples, and their governments, are sufficiently resilient to survive even another generation or so 
remains to be seen.  The challenges are certainly formidable.”). 
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are different from those of the dominant society.30  The fact that courts and 
Congress have placed Indian tribes in a different constitutional status than 
non-Indian governing bodies,31 occupying what Gerald Neuman calls 
“anomalous zones,”32 makes finding a solution more difficult.  There are 
also vast economic, governance, and geopolitical differences among 
American tribes.  However, since the article is not about Indian tribes other 
than as a federalism challenge, it does not describe those differences or the 
erratic judicial, legislative, and executive approaches to tribes over this 
country’s history—approaches that have reduced them to their current 
endangered condition.33  It is enough for this article’s purpose to 
acknowledge that these differences make finding a single solution to the 
 
30.  See Price, supra note 23, at 709 (“[T]here may be distinct, and particularly compelling, 
normative reasons to accommodate different procedural traditions in the tribal and territorial 
contexts.  The territories, after all, are not even permanently joined to the United States, and 
Indian tribes possess a sovereignty that long predates the Constitution.  Furthermore, both sets of 
communities have traditions distinct from Anglo-American norms.  Adherence to these distinct 
norms may be important not only to the cultural identity of these communities, but also to the 
public legitimacy of tribal and territorial prosecutions in the affected communities.”). 
31.  WILKINS & KIIWETINEPINESIIK STARK, supra note 3, at 231 (explaining how the Indian 
Civil Rights Act imposed “key portions of the bill of Rights in statutory form on tribal 
governments in their relations with reservation residents, but tribes are still immune from the 
reach of the federal Constitution”).  See also Robertson, supra note 6, at 391 (characterizing the 
Indian Civil Rights Act which “illustrates the intention of Congress to bring the tribes within the 
conceptual scheme of federalism while simultaneously making more secure their right to tribal 
autonomy.”). 
32.  See Gerald L. Neuman, Anomolous Zones, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1197, 1202-03 (1996).  See 
also id. at 1201 (defining an anomalous zone as “a geographical area in which certain legal rules, 
otherwise regarded as embodying fundamental policies of the larger legal system, are locally 
suspended.”).  See also Price, supra note 23, at 658 (“Native American reservations and insular 
territories of the United States have long been ‘anomalous zones’ of U.S. constitutional law, areas 
where usual rules do not apply and the Supreme Court’s constitutional analysis has a distressingly 
ad hoc character.  In the nineteenth century, as the United States expanded across the continent 
and acquired its first overseas territories, the Supreme Court established that Congress has 
‘plenary’ governmental authority, beyond its usual limited enumerated powers, with respect to 
Indian tribes and the territories.  The Court further held that constitutional rights and other 
limitations on governmental action apply only incompletely, if at all, to governance of these 
areas.”).  
33.  For readers interested in those issues see, e.g., Ericson & Snow, supra note 6, at 446 
(“The controversy over the status of the tribe mirrors the unsettled status of the individual Indian 
in the United States.  Two conflicting policies-separation and assimilation-have been formulated 
to define the Indian’s relationship to this society, but Congress, the ultimate arbiter of Indian 
affairs, has demonstrated a chronic inability finally to decide which of the two it will pursue.  The 
former policy is designed to separate the Indian from the rest of American society and leave him a 
degree of self-government through his own institutions.  The latter policy is calculated to place the 
Indian in the cultural ‘melting pot’ and have him enter the mainstream of American society.  The 
coexistence of these conflicting policies has created constant tension and uncertainty of direction 
in the body of law which governs the Indian and his tribe.”).  See generally Alex Tallchief 
Skibine, Constitutionalism, Federal Common Law, and the Inherent Powers of Indian Tribes, 38 
AM. INDIAN L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (tracing the erratic Indian policies of Congress and the 
Supreme Court). 
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Indian tribal federalism problem very difficult, and that these entrenched, 
ill-advised policies have contributed to the uncertain, even perilous, 
position tribes find themselves in today. 
The article begins by briefly describing the current place of tribes in 
our constitutional configuration.  The second part of the article explores the 
impediments to integrating tribes into the existing bivalent constitutional 
federal structure, while the third part discusses the inherent plasticity of 
federalism.  The fourth part explains why it is preferable to find an 
approach that integrates tribes into the Constitution, as opposed to leaving 
them outside it, even though this eliminates some otherwise appealing 
solutions and raises the difficulty bar.  Extra-constitutional approaches 
seem neither bold nor permanent enough to warrant discussion in this 
context, although admittedly they might be politically salient and stress the 
current federalism arrangement less.34 
The fifth part describes specific approaches for empowering Indian 
tribes within a constitutional framework.  It is divided into two sections:  
The first examines approaches that rely on a specific textual enabling power 
in the Constitution, such as found in the Compact, Territories, Enclave, and 
Treaty Clauses.  The second section looks at those that would require a 
constitutional amendment, for example, creating a new tribal state, giving 
tribes separate voting representation in Congress with weighted votes on 
issues directly affecting their tribal constituents, or creating separate tribal 
election districts within or among states or even a single election district 
covering the entire nation.  The article evaluates each approach, whether 
based on the exercise of existing constitutional authority or premised on 
expanding that authority through the amendment process, to determine the 
extent to which it might:  (1) weaken or threaten the country’s stability and 
security, (2) enhance the capacity of tribes to manage their futures more 
effectively, (3) be sufficiently receptive to disparities among tribes, and (4) 
have political salience and thus increase the likelihood of implementation.35 
 
34.  Some examples of these are the creation of a U.S. protectorate with enhanced trust 
responsibilities that is directly responsive to tribal direction; treating tribes like cities; creating a 
super tribal legislative body that functions in some advisory capacity to the Executive Branch; or 
devolving more federal executive power to tribes.  To the extent that any of these approaches 
becomes relevant in the discussion of the approaches the article focuses on, they will be 
mentioned and useful sources identified where more information about them can be found. 
35.  See Tarunabh Khaitan, Dignity as an Expressive Norm:  Neither Vacuous Nor a 
Panacea. 32 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 1, 16 (2012) (referring to disability rights, and saying 
“legal recognition of minority rights can only follow a threshold level of political 
consciousness.”). 
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The article concludes by suggesting the creation of a virtual nationwide 
tribal election district that would aggregate all Indian tribes and their 
members, regardless of their geographic location.  The purpose of this 
nationwide election district would be to elect a proportionate number of 
tribal representatives to the House of Representatives based on the 
percentage of Indians in the entire United States’ population.  Although the 
approach means some voters might experience a change in the ethnicity of 
their elected representative—which could generate political  
opposition—since the participation of tribal representatives would not be 
restricted to matters that only affect tribes, tribal representatives would be 
indistinguishable from non-tribal ones.  The number of tribal 
representatives would need to be large enough to influence matters of 
concern to tribes, but not large enough to change the balance of political 
power in the House. 
The approach would require an amendment to the Constitution because 
of the change in how representatives are elected.  However, it does not 
fracture political boundaries by requiring the formation of additional states 
or pose a threat to national security or internal stability, as there might be if 
tribes could enter into agreements with foreign countries.  This proposal is 
somewhere on the border of fanciful and possible, neither perfect nor 
problem-free, and, therefore, only theoretically feasible at a very abstract 
level.  It does, however, have roots in approaches found in other countries 
and election law scholarship.  The hope is that it has sufficient traction to 
warrant further consideration by those concerned about the problem of 
diminished tribal sovereignty. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The question animating this article is one posed by the late Phillip 
Frickey:  “what exactly should be the position of the tribal sovereign in a 
constitutional republic as we head into the twenty-first century?”36  One 
reason this question exists is because tribes have not been incorporated into 
the constitutional design of our government either ab initio or by virtue of a 
constitutional amendment.37  Perhaps the drafters of the Constitution 
 
36.  Frickey, supra note 11, at 472 (quoting Frank Pommersheim, Lara:  A Constitutional 
Crisis in Indian Law?, 28 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 299, 305 (2004)).  See also id. at 484 (“In effect, 
the Supreme Court has become the site of an ongoing mini-constitutional convention for 
evaluating the essentially insolvable conundrums of the place of tribes in the American 
constitutional system.”).  
37.  Id. at 436 (“At the most basic level, tribes have never been brought into the United 
States through formal means, such as by a constitutional amendment incorporating them into the 
federal-state design.”).  Frickey, however, goes on to note that “[m]ore than three hundred years 
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considered tribes to be outside the country’s political system, so naturally 
they did not provide for their ultimate incorporation into it.38 
The Constitution was written in a time when tribes were powerful 
and occupied much of North America.  War, peace, trade, and 
treatymaking—as contemplated by Articles I and II of the 
Constitution—were the orders of the day.  By the end of the 
nineteenth century, when tribes had been subjugated, the 
Constitution no longer fit the context.  But the Constitution was 
never amended formally to incorporate tribes into the 
constitutional structure, and, ideally, to recognize their unique 
status and legitimate claims to continued self-government.  
Instead, Congress simply began legislating as if it had plenary 
authority over Indian country, and the Court ratified this arrogation 
of power.39 
In contrast to the Reconstruction Amendments, for tribes there has 
never been a “‘constitutional moment’ during which the nation and the 
nations within it were collectively reorganized.”40  This makes the “[f]orced 
judicial incorporation of tribes into the constitutional structure . . . a very 
different, and far more difficult, venture.”41 
 
after the first colonial encounter, tribes retained a variety of important interests, including novel 
property rights and a unique kind of sovereignty.”  Id. at 437. 
38.  Skibine, supra note 33, at 41 (“The argument being considered is that the drafters of the 
original Constitution contemplated the Indian Tribes to be outside the political system of the 
United States so, of course, they did not make any provision for their eventual incorporation into 
the Constitution.”).   
39.  Frickey, supra note 11, at 464.  The first recognition of Indian tribal sovereignty most 
likely occurred when the United States Senate ratified the first treaty with an Indian nation, the 
Delawares, in 1778.  See Skibine, supra note 33, at 19 n.115. 
40.  Frickey, supra note 11, at 485-86, n. 279; but see Tebben, supra note 7, at 324 (“Both 
the tribes and the States are pre-constitutional in the sense that both kinds of governments existed 
as sovereigns before the creation of the United States Constitution.  Moreover, both the tribes and 
the States have some reserved extra-constitutional sovereign authority that has not been delegated 
to the national government, even though the delegation process itself was not the same for each 
kind of government.  Both States and tribes are recognized as sovereign governments in the 
document; both have constitutional status.”). 
41.  Frickey, supra note 11 at 485, n.279.  To the extent constitutional principles have been 
invoked, they rarely reflect any moral high ground vis-à-vis the tribes – more often, the rights of 
the majority are upheld over any perceived rights of Indians or their tribes.  See LAURA E. EVANS, 
POWER FROM POWERLESSNESS:  TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS, INSTITUTIONAL NICHES, AND 
AMERICAN FEDERALISM 5 (2011) (paraphrasing Madison and saying “the smaller the sphere, the 
easier it is for the more powerful faction to dominate government,” resulting in “small, often 
impoverished American Indian populations . . . simply to be left out of local politics.”).  Evans 
advocates that tribes use “institutional niches” in the political realm to develop “generalizable 
skills,” which doesn’t necessarily lead to their winning high profile battles.  Id.  Rather, “the 
effects are indirect and of low visibility.  In isolation, each new success seems unremarkable; 
cumulatively, the effects are impressive.” Id. at 5-6. 
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Some Indian law scholars maintain that the Treaty Clause42 
incorporates tribes into the Constitution.  But Alex Tallchief Skibine 
expresses his misgiving about this basis for incorporation, limiting the 
Clause’s usefulness to geographic incorporation.43  Carol Tebben’s 
trifederalism theory of constitutional incorporation of Indian tribes relies on 
the Indian Commerce Clause,44 which, she contends, “recognized that 
Congress was to deal with the tribes on issues of commerce” as 
governmental bodies.45  She finds further support for tribal incorporation in 
Article 1, clause 3, excluding “Indians not taxed” from state population 
rolls for purposes of apportioning representatives in the House of 
Representatives among the states.  She sees this phraseology as implicitly 
recognizing tribal nations as independent of the states and the Union, 
 
42.  Several Indian law scholars support the concept of treaty federalism.  See, e.g., RUSSELL 
BARSH & JAMES HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES AND POLITICAL LIBERTY 270 (1980) 
(“Even if the Constitution itself did not guarantee certain inalienable political rights to all citizens, 
tribes would be entitled to political self-determination by virtue of their agreements with the 
United States . . . They are political compacts irrevocably annexing tribes to the federal system in 
a status parallel to, but not identical with, that of the [S]tates.”).  Frank Pommersheim, for 
example, lends support to the creation of a national/tribal relationship of “constitutional faith” 
based on “important foundational understandings relative to the constitutional status of tribal 
sovereignty and principles of treaty federalism.”  Frank Pommersheim, Tribal Courts and the 
Federal Judiciary:  Opportunities and Challenges for a Constitutional Democracy, 58 MONT. L. 
REV. 313, 329 n.73 (1997).  Richard Monette, on the other hand, rejects the idea of “treaty 
federalism” because it does not extend to tribes without treaties and instead suggests using the 
concept of the Equal Footing Doctrine, which would construct a legal equality of treaty situation 
where one does not technically exist and mirror the doctrine’s application to the states.  See 
generally, Richard Monette, A New Federalism for Indian Tribes:  The Relationship Between the 
United States and Tribes in Light of Our Federalism and Republican Democracy, 25 U. TOL. L. 
REV. 617 (1994).  
43.  Alex Tallchief Skibine, Redefining the Status of Indian Tribes within “Our Federalism”:  
Beyond the Dependency Paradigm, 38 CONN. L. REV. 667, 670 (2006).  (“In Johnson v. M’Intosh, 
the Court declared that pursuant to the doctrine of discovery, the land of the Indian tribes had been 
geographically incorporated within the territory of the United States.”).  But see Biolsi, supra note 
1, at 244 (“Rehnquist insisted that “upon incorporation into the territory of the United States, the 
Indian tribes thereby come under the territorial sovereignty of the United States and their exercise 
of separate power is constrained so as not to conflict with the interests of this overriding 
sovereignty.”  Thus, there are ‘inherent limitations on tribal powers that stem from their 
incorporation into the United States.’”) (quoting Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe 435 U.S. 
191, 208 (1978)).  
44.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (authorizing Congress “to regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”).   
45.  See Tebben, supra note 7, at 322 (advocating a theory of trifederalism).  See also 
Skibine, supra note 43, at 668 (“Although most scholars would concede that Indian tribes have 
been incorporated within the territorial limits of the United States, whether they have been 
incorporated within the political system of the United States is a controversial issue.  While some 
scholars have forcefully argued against such incorporation, other scholars have recently argued 
that Indian tribes have been incorporated into ‘Our Federalism,’ either under a system of 
trifederalism or treaty federalism.”).  
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although she finds this recognition more indirect than what can be found in 
the Commerce Clause.46 
Other scholars consider the constitutional status of tribes to be 
irrelevant because tribes are both “pre-constitutional”—their existence as 
separate sovereign entities predated the emergence of the United  
States—and, since they do not owe their existence to the Constitution, they 
possess “extraconstitutional” authority enabling them to exercise their 
inherent powers without constitutional constraint.47  Thus, tribes function as 
“semi-autonomous nations within a nation,”48 and claims of tribal 
sovereignty do not “depend on any document of positive law internal to the 
United States.”49  Frickey’s belief that tribes are “preexisting entities with a 
 
46.  Tebben, supra note 7, at 322.  See also Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Original 
Understanding of the Political Status of Indian Tribes, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 153, 176-77 (2008) 
(Senator Doolittle discussing the “Indians not taxed clause” of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
saying “Indians not taxed were excluded because they were not regarded as a portion of the 
population of the United States.  They are subject to the tribes to which they belong, and those 
tribes are always spoken of in the Constitution as if they were independent nations, to some 
extent, existing in our midst but not constituting a part of our population, and with whom we make 
treaties.”) (quoting CONG. GLOBE 49th Cong., 1st Sess. 571 (1866)).  Tebben also argues that the 
Tenth Amendment, by reserving power not only to the states but also to the people inferentially 
provides support for tribal sovereignty.  Tebben, supra note 7, at 323 (“These words giving 
recognition to the reserved power of the States also provide explicit support for the reserved 
power of Native governments.  The amendment goes deeper than stating that the power which is 
not delegated to the United States government is reserved to the States by including the phrase “or 
to the people.”  The commanding words “to the people,” inclusive of the Native peoples of tribal 
America as United States citizens, give constitutional cover to self-government in Indian country 
and to the sovereignty placed in these governments by the people.  The Tenth Amendment 
augments other constitutional language by providing an explicit basis for the constitutional 
recognition of the sovereign tribal right of self-government.”).  Alex Tallchief Skibine builds on 
Tebben’s approach by suggesting the Court should adopt a Dormant Commerce Clause analytical 
approach to questions of tribal sovereignty when they arise. Skibine, supra note 33, at 5-6 
(arguing that this mode of analysis will not “unnecessarily demean tribal sovereignty by arbitrarily 
and progressively adopting narrower and narrower judicial definitions of tribal self-
government . . . .”). 
47.  Biolsi, supra note 1, at 243 (“Because [tribes] are preconstitutional—their existence as 
sovereign polities predates the existence of the United States—they are also extraconstitutional:  
They exercise their sovereignty without constraint by the federal Constitution or federal law in 
general . . . .  Thus, the Supreme Court as early as 1896 held that the Bill of Rights was not a 
constraint on what tribal governments do to their own tribal citizens.”) (citing Talton v. Mayes, 
163 U.S.  376 (1896); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978)).  Ann Tweedy 
observes that the three constitutional references to tribes in the Constitution and the Treaty Clause 
“embody a view that tribes are sovereign, and permanently so, but that their sovereignty operates 
largely outside of the constitutional framework.”  Anne E. Tweedy, Connecting the Dots Between 
the Constitution, the Marshall Trilogy, and United States v. Lara:  Notes Toward a Blueprint for 
the Next Legislative Restoration of Tribal Sovereignty, 42 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 651, 658 
(1999). 
48.  Frickey, supra note 11, at 485 n.279. 
49.  Krakoff, supra note 11, at 1155-56. 
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reservoir of retained, inherent,50 extra-constitutional authority” formed the 
basis of his resistance to the idea that there are only “two sovereigns under 
the Constitution, federal and state, both governed by the founding 
document,” because tribes “are outside this framework.”51 
However, the characterization of tribes as possessing extra-
constitutional authority because they are pre-constitutional has been 
problematic given the Supreme Court’s skepticism “about the merits of 
allowing any extra-constitutional governmental authority within the 
American polity.”52  This skepticism has manifested itself in the Court’s 
recent “decisional path that undercuts tribal prerogatives”53 and leads to 
 
50.  Price, supra note 23, at 697 (“Finally, with respect to Indian tribes, legal recognition that 
their sovereignty is at least partially inherent and not federally derived is critically important to 
many Native Americans.  This legal principle has political and cultural significance as a belated 
acknowledgment of tribes’ dignity and standing as political communities.  It has also provided a 
theoretical foundation for autonomous tribal self-government, including criminal enforcement 
without double jeopardy implications for other sovereigns.”).   The concept of dignity and its role 
in human rights law is its own topic beyond the scope of this paper, other than when it is realized 
as an expressive norm making negative behavior legally and morally suspect, it may add an 
additional normative layer to any discussion of full tribal partnership in our federal system of 
governance.  See generally Khaitan, supra note 35, at 9 (“As an expressive norm, dignity brings 
something quite unique to the moral high table”; noting in addition that it is neither 
consequentionalist nor “necessarily egalitarian, although unequal treatment often conveys 
significant moral meaning.”); see also id. at 19 (“‘Dignity’ appears to be indeterminate because it 
is in fact a single label for very different norms that, nonetheless, have one common 
presupposition:  that meanings expressed by actions matter morally.”).  Of additional import for 
that discussion is Khaitan’s acknowledgment that actions by “collective bodies, including the 
state, can have expressive meanings, and thereby constitute expressive wrongs,” implying that the 
state then can correct morally questionable expressive wrongs.  Id. at 9 n.55. 
51.  Frickey, supra note 11, at 479.  Frickey complains additionally that Justice Kennedy, to 
whom he attributes this view, is guilty of what he calls a more important conceptual mistake of 
thinking that “the Court has any legitimate authority to incorporate tribes into the constitutional 
structure in a way that domesticates tribal authority with constitutional values.”  Id. at 480; see 
also id. at 481 (“Justices Kennedy and Souter are wrong in supposing that the constitutional 
scheme does not account for the tribes.  As Chief Justice Marshall understood long ago in 
Cherokee Nation, the Commerce Clause includes tribes in a list with other acknowledged 
sovereigns:  foreign nations and the states.  One need not be able to translate noscitur a sociis to 
recognize that the Constitution places tribes on a sovereign plane.  In addition, as Chief Justice 
Marshall recognized in Worcester, the constitutional framework places authority over Indian 
affairs in the federal, not state, government by its allocation of the treaty power, the commerce 
power, and the powers concerning war and peace.”).   See also Worchester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 
515, 519 (1832) (“The very term ‘nation,’ so generally applied to them, means a ‘people distinct 
from others.’  The [C]onstitution, by declaring treaties already made, as well as those to be made, 
to be the supreme law of the land, has adopted and sanctioned the previous treaties with the Indian 
nations, and, consequently admits their rank among those powers who are capable of making 
treaties.”). 
52.  Price, supra note 23, at 659-60 (calling this a “fundamental dilemma” facing both tribes 
and territories).  Pommersheim bemoans the failure of the courts to develop a “meaningful 
constitutional idiom or discourse,” resulting in “aimless wandering in an (extra) constitutional 
wilderness.”  Pommersheim, supra note 42, at 328  (parenthesis contained in original). 
53.  Frickey, supra note 11, at 490 (noting that “several Justices [have] openly challenged the 
notion that tribes should be recognized as self-governing in the first place”).  This recent history 
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their marginalization precisely because they are not part of the 
constitutional governance system. 
Some scholars find the act of treaty making “imparted a European 
version of nationhood to the Native party, and as a result, established at 
least legal parity, in terms of co-equal sovereignty, between aboriginal and 
European states.”54  These treaties indicate “beyond question that Indian 
nations had existed as self-governing nations prior to their contact with 
Europeans.”55  However, even though tribes might once have been foreign 
nations, they clearly are no longer “because of ‘peculiar and cardinal 
distinctions which exist nowhere else’”—they are “within the boundaries 
of, were viewed by foreign nations as subject to the authority of, and had 
entered into treaties in which they acknowledged being under the protection 
of, the United States.”56  At most, tribes might be considered a 
“constitutional hybrid,”57 like states in some respects and foreign nations in 
others, occupying an “intermediate category between foreign and domestic 
states.”58  While this description does nothing to advance the cause of 
 
stands in stark contrast to Canada and Australia’s recognition of the innate and legitimate 
exceptionalism of Native peoples in law and fact.  See also id.  (“In 1982, Canada provided 
greater entrenchment to the unique status of its Natives.”).  More recently, it designated a 
homeland for Native people.  Nunavut Lands Claim Agreement Act 1993, S.C., chs. 28-29 
(Can.)).  Australia began struggling anew with the status of its Native peoples in the 1990s, 
stimulated by a decision of its high court.  Mabo v. Queensland (No. 2) (1992), 175 C.L.R. 1 
(Austl.). 
54.  Dorris, supra note 27, at 49. 
55.  Id.  See also Fletcher, supra, note 46, 172 (“The first Indian treaty, the [1778] Treaty of 
Fort Pitt, was a treaty of defensive alliance between two foreign nations.”); See also id. at 176 
(quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 498 (1866) (“From the opening debates, Senator 
Trumbull asserted that ‘[o]ur dealings with the Indians are with them as foreigners, as separate 
nations.  We deal with them by treaty and not by law’ . . . .”)).  
56.  Frickey, supra note 11, at 437-38.  See also Ericson & Snow, supra note 6, at 455 
(“With such justification, and the belief that it was a permanent solution, the exchanges of land 
became an honorable way to avoid dealing with the more difficult and more basic political 
conflicts of interest inherent in allowing a ‘sovereign nation’ to exist within a state without being 
incorporated into the federal system.”).  See also Fletcher, supra note 46, at 179 (commenting that 
the court’s use of the political question doctrine in matters of Indian law is comparable to how the 
Court treats congressional or Executive branch foreign affairs decisions); see also id. at 177 
(quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2890 (1866). Senator Howard objected to the 
inclusion of the “Indians Not Taxed” clause in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment because it 
was unnecessary: 
I hope that amendment [adding said clause] to the amendment will not be 
adopted.  Indians born within the limits of the United States and who maintain 
their tribal relations are not in the sense of this amendment born subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States.  They are regarded, and always have been in 
our legislation and jurisprudence, as being quasi-foreign nations. 
Id. 
57.  Price, supra note 23, at 670. 
58.  Id.  (“The sparse guidance the Constitution itself provides on the status of America’s 
native peoples seems to place Indian tribes in an intermediate category between foreign and 
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placing tribes in the Constitution, it does emphasize their difference from 
the current constitutional sovereigns and the improbability of treating them 
as either the federal government or a state. 
Despite various efforts to “constitutionalize” Indian tribes and define 
tribal sovereignty, it is unquestionable that tribes have never become part of 
our constitutional federal framework as sovereign governments precisely 
because their existence as sovereign nations pre-dated the Constitution, and 
they have historically stood outside the Constitution.59  Indeed, Carol 
Tebben argues that tribes cannot have “constitutional status as sovereigns 
within the governmental structure of the United States” because 
“[h]istorically, tribes stood as totally independent international sovereigns, 
each equal in status to the United States government, and the structural 
relationship of tribal nations to the United States has been based largely 
upon treaties.”60  Consistent with that view, some tribes and tribal 
confederacies have occasionally acted as though they retained “some of the 
prerogatives of external sovereignty,” for example, by issuing a separate 
declaration of war against the Axis powers in 1941 and by dispensing tribal 
passports for some forms of international travel, which are accepted by 
European nations.61 
Perhaps the lack of a constitutional tether for Indian tribes is one reason 
there has been enormous theoretical incoherence on the topic of Indian 
tribal sovereignty.62  The federal government considers tribes to be 
 
domestic states.”).  Price comments that “there is no foreign state that can claim sovereignty in 
U.S. territories, nor any diplomatic context or limitations on U.S. authority that may make 
compliance with constitutional procedural guarantees impracticable,” even though the United 
States could renounce sovereignty over both territories and, by implication, tribes.  Id. at 713. 
59.  See Frickey, supra note 11, at 467-68 (“Just when and how did all the Indian tribes 
become part of the constitutional system? The answer from constitutional text is never, and if it is 
to happen, something on the order of a constitutional amendment or renewed, targeted treaty-
making would be required. Neither Congress, through its long-established plenary power, nor the 
Court, through its newer common law of colonialism, ever gave Indian tribes the choice of 
providing or withholding, the ‘consent of the governed’ to any unilateral aspect of federal 
control.”).  But cf. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal Consent, 8 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 45, 56 (2012) 
(maintaining that tribes “have been at least partially incorporated into the American constitutional 
polity, playing a part alongside the states and the federal government,” even though these 
arrangements have never been codified). 
60.  Tebben, supra note 7, at 319.  See also Elizabeth Hutchinson, The Dress of His Nation:  
Romney’s Portrait of Joseph Brant, 45 WINTERTHUR PORTFOLIO 208, 219 (2011) (“As the term 
‘diplomat’ reminds us, Native Americans were not subjects of the British Crown in the eighteenth 
century.  Tribes negotiated as sovereign nations with each other and with representatives of 
European states.”).  Hutchinson comments that European “attitudes of cultural superiority and 
expansionist ambitions led some Europeans to disregard these relationships, making it important 
for native leaders to assert their interests, which they often did in diplomatic costume.”  Id. 
61.  Dorris, supra note 27, at 67 n.47. 
62.  See Robertson, supra note 6, at 373 (describing “the analytical quagmire that has 
plagued the doctrine of tribal sovereignty since its inception” and saying: “First, tribal 
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equivalent to a state:  “a distinct political society, separated from others, 
capable of managing its own affairs and governing itself,”63 albeit subject to 
the primacy of Congress.64  But this analogy is fundamentally flawed 
because tribes are “uniquely different” from states; they were never part of 
the Union.65  “Even staunch federalists have to concede that states 
originally consented to cede some of their sovereignty to form the 
government of the United States”—something staunch supporters of 
American Indian tribal sovereignty need not do.66 
The Supreme Court has further muddied the picture of tribal 
sovereignty by creating a third category of sovereignty just for  
tribes—”domestic dependent nation”—a characterization that Skibine calls 
‘“exceptionally’ bad,” as it has allowed the Court to slowly and surely 
dismantle “[t]he idea that Indian tribes can continue to thrive as sovereigns 
outside our constitutional structure.”67  The consequence of being a 
 
sovereignty, unlike that which inheres in other autonomous entities, is without an irreducible 
normative core . . . Second, the doctrine is so vague that any specific powers of self-government 
which remain vested in the tribes cannot be objectively determined in advance of a 
pronouncement by the Court. There is neither a principled method of determining which powers 
the tribes have retained nor which powers have been implicitly invested.”).  Robertson blames the 
“paradoxical characterization of the relationship between the tribes and the United States” as 
being one of “independent dependence,” which he says flowed from the second and third 
decisions in the Marshall Indian Sovereignty trilogy for subsequent confusion by courts and for 
undermining tribal sovereignty.  Id. at 382. 
63.  Frickey, supra note 11, at 437 (quoting Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 16 
(1831)).  See also Fletcher, supra note 46, at 180 (“The historical record for the period 
encompassing, at the very least, 1763 through the Articles of Confederation, the Constitution, and 
even the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, provides remarkably unambiguous support for 
the proposition that the original understanding of the Framers was that Indian affairs must be dealt 
with in the context of tribal political relationships with the federal government.”). 
64.  Frickey, supra note 11, at 440 (finding significant in terms of the separateness of tribes 
that the Articles of Confederation spoke of “managing all the affairs with the Indians,’ not 
managing all the affairs of the Indians.”) (emphasis added). 
65.  Id.  at 485 n.279. 
66.  Krakoff, supra note 11, at 1156 (“Even staunch federalists have to concede that states 
originally consented to cede some of their sovereignty to form the government of the United 
States.  The staunchest proponents of American Indian tribal sovereignty need not do so.”).  A 
counter argument, if tribal advocates are willing to admit that they conceded their sovereignty to 
the federal government, is that “a modern understanding of such transfers suggests that in doing so 
they ought to have been accorded some form of guaranteed representation in the” country’s 
democratic institutions.  Trevor Knight, Electoral Justice for Aboriginal People in Canada, 46 
MCGILL L.J. 1063, 1108 (2001) (making this point with respect to Canada’s aboriginal peoples 
and the “democratic institutions of Canada”). 
67.  Skibine, supra note 39, at 5.  Here Skibine is reacting to Frickey’s characterization of the 
approach as being “exceptionalist” because it recognized tribes as being “a government outside 
the constitutional structure that retained elements of preexisting aboriginal sovereignty.”  Frickey, 
supra note 11, at 443.  Frickey finds further support for his characterization of tribes as 
exceptional in the Articles of Confederation, which speak of “‘managing all the affairs with the 
Indians,’ not managing all the affairs of the Indians.’” Id.  at 440. 
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dependent nation within a nation has left tribes trapped68 and often 
“relegated to minor spaces, reservations, bread-crumbs of land conceded by 
the dominant society.”69  As essentially “stateless minorities,” Indian tribes 
have also been “more vulnerable to the interests of the regional majority in 
federal contexts.”70 
A combination of treaties and reserved off-reservation rights affirm the 
“semblance of sovereignty” for tribes, giving them at least co-management 
authority over matters covered by these treaties and entailing “an 
assumption of coequal sovereignty.”71  This view lends itself to a 
conception of tribal sovereignty as “quasi” or “permeated” to the extent 
tribal members are subject to different sovereigns—federal, state, and 
tribal—in the same “coterminous physical space.”72  Thus, tribal 
sovereignty is not “panoptical,” i.e. not a form of “sovereignty [that] is 
fully, flatly, and evenly operative over each square centimeter of legally 
demarcated territory” in which all citizens, including tribal members, 
receive “more or less equal treatment” and “from the imputed standpoint of 
the state [are] interchangeable as objects of the state’s gaze.”73  Indeed, with 
respect to tribal sovereignty, the “state’s gaze” is quite “studiously 
nonpanoptical,” as sovereignty under those circumstances is “carefully 
zoned”74 and limited. 
 
68.  Austen L. Parish, Changing Territoriality, Fading Sovereignty, and the Development of 
Indigenous Rights, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 291, 298 (2007). 
69.  Id.  at 299 (quoting Siegfried Wiessner, Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples:  A 
Global Comparative and International Legal Analysis, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 57, 58-59 (1999)). 
70.  Papillon, supra note 5, at 4 (“[t]he ambiguous status of Indigenous peoples and their lack 
of direct representation in the federal system further contribute to their vulnerability.”).  Papillon, 
in his comparative analysis of Canadian and U.S. federalism, comments that “State/provincial 
capitals see Indigenous territorial enclaves as unjustified extensions of federal powers within their 
jurisdiction while federal authorities have long governed Indigenous lands and communities as 
colonial outposts in which basic citizenship rights mattered little.  Id. 
71.  Biolsi, supra note 1, at 246.   
72.  Id.  at 245 (“the lived reality of a graduated, ‘quasi’ (Jackson 1990), or ‘permeated’ 
sovereignty (Biersteker and Weber 1996:9).  Tribal homelands are relegated, under federal law, to 
a condition of heteronomous political space in which different citizens are subject to different 
sovereigns in coterminous physical space.”)  (citations contained in original). 
73.  Id.  at 240 (“The modern state claims, as Benedict Anderson puts it, “sovereignty [that] 
is fully, flatly, and evenly operative over each square centimeter of a legally demarcated territory” 
(1991:19).  Such panoptical sovereignty—along with the idea of the nation as an imagined 
community—also implies the more or less equal treatment of citizens, who become, from the 
imputed standpoint of the state, interchangeable as objects of the state’s gaze.”) (citations and 
brackets contained in original). 
74.  Id. at 240 (“What results is a system of variegated citizenship in which populations 
subjected to different regimes of value enjoy different kinds of rights, discipline, caring, and 
security.” (Ong 1999:217). The state’s gaze, in other words, may be studiously nonpanoptical, its 
sovereignty purposely not flat, full, or even across its territory but carefully zoned.”) (citations 
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Regardless of whether tribes are separate nations comparable to states, 
domestic dependent nations, or quasi sovereigns, over the passage of time, 
tribes have lost many of the attributes of their sovereignty75 through a 
process Skibine calls “implicit divestiture.”76  The question still remains, 
however, whether tribes, regardless of their diminished sovereignty, are 
distinct political units, external sovereigns of some sort, or have they been 
merged into the dominant political landscape and thus lost their externality?  
Skibine points to moments in American history when tribes were identified 
as distinct political units—distinct from the states in which they were 
located and from the federal government that had become their protector.77 
 
contained in original).  See also id. at 245 (Aleinikoff calls tribal sovereignty “the semblance of 
sovereignty.”). 
75. See Skibine, supra note 43, at 681 (“[T]hrough their original incorporation into United 
States as well as through specific treaties and statutes, Indian tribes have lost many of the 
attributes of sovereignty. We concluded that the inherent sovereignty of Indian tribes was limited 
to their members and their territory: exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect 
tribal self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of 
the tribes. The dependent status of Indian tribes is necessarily inconsistent with their freedom to 
determine their external relations.”) (quoting Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 650-
51 (2001)). Skibine comments that Rehnquist’s quote indicates he: 
[S]trongly believed that most tribal powers had been lost not as a result of 
actions by the political branches of the government but upon the tribes’ “original 
incorporation” into the United States. Furthermore, this divestiture flowed not 
because tribal powers are in conflict with federal interests as determined by the 
Congress, but because of what the Court independently determines flows from 
the tribes’ dependent status.  
Id.   
76.  This Implicit Divestiture Doctrine, according to Skibine, was first used in Cherokee 
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831) to describe tribes, but more firmly developed in Duro v. 
Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990).  Under this doctrine, tribes have been implicitly divested of any 
vestiges of sovereignty that might be considered inconsistent with their domestic dependent nation 
status.  Skibine, supra note 33, at 5. 
77.  See Skibine, supra note 43, at 671 (“Concerning the tribes’ incorporation into the 
various states’ geographical boundaries, Marshall stated that “[t]he treaties and laws of the United 
States contemplate the Indian territory as completely separated from that of the states.”  On 
inherent tribal sovereign powers, Marshall asserted that “[t]he Indian nations had always been 
considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as 
the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial, with the single exception of that 
imposed by irresistible power, which excluded them from intercourse with any other European 
potentate . . .” Justice Marshall’s conception of the relations between the United States and the 
tribes seemed to have been very similar to the “protectorate” model, a system first invented by 
England in 1815, a mere eight years before Johnson.”). See also id. at 673 (“The 1871 Act is 
important in that it represented a desire to more completely incorporate the tribes into the 
American political system.  Also important to the incorporation process was the decision to 
require treaties to contain specific clauses excluding Indian reservations from being considered 
part of the state where they were located.  Equally relevant was the decision to make Indians 
citizens not only of the United States, but also of the various states where they reside.”); Ericson 
& Snow, supra note 6, at 456 (“In 1871, after most of the tribes had been settled on reservations, 
Congress moved to end the most obvious manifestation of its ambivalent treatment of Indians.  In 
a paragraph of an appropriations act the practice of making treaties with Indian nations was ended.  
From the act’s implicit recognition of the problems of maintaining separate Indian groups a short 
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Matthew Fletcher finds significance in the courts’ treatment of questions 
concerning Indian tribes as political questions, which enables the courts to 
avoid dealing with matters that involve political relations between the 
United States and Indian peoples.78  Using the political question doctrine in 
matters of Indian law is comparable to how courts treat congressional or 
executive branch foreign affairs decisions.79  Cynthia Cumfer observes that 
settlers, “[b]y denationalizing native communities without incorporating 
jurisdiction over them into the white sovereignty, created pressure to 
develop an alternative for indigenous peoples to Vattel’s category of 
nationhood.”80  However, this was not done, perhaps because 
acknowledging tribes as “a third category of sovereigns within the borders 
of the United States” not limited by the Constitution might be considered 
inconsistent with what it means to be an American citizen.81 
The theoretical incoherence on the issue of tribal sovereignty82 and the 
confusion about recognizing tribes as separate sovereigns, yet subject to 
 
step brought Congress to the assimilative policies embodied in the legislation of the 1880’s.”).  
But see Robert A. Fairbanks, Native American Sovereignty and Treaty Rights:  Are They 
Historical Illusions?, 20 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 141, 147 (1996) (commenting on the 1871 Act and 
saying:  “Clearly, Congress had concluded that the various Native American peoples no longer 
deserved, or required, the recognition of respect of a sovereign personality.”); Frickey, supra note 
11, at 440-41 (“Although the abandonment of treatymaking was a matter of internal congressional 
politics, the symbolism of the action cut against the notion of tribes as sovereigns.”). 
78.  Fletcher, supra note 46, at 179 (“As a result of this rule, the interpretation and even 
constitutionality of federal statutes that apply to members of federally recognized Indian tribes 
was treated as a political question until the last few decades.  This robust denial of finding a 
justiciable question exemplifies the Supreme Court’s understanding that relations between the 
United States and Indian people are political.”).  Fletcher finds the list of cases involving Indian 
law questions that the Supreme Court has side-stepped under the political question doctrine 
“remarkable.”  Id.  at 178, n.131 (listing those cases). 
79.  Id. at 179. See also id. at 180 (“The historical record for the period encompassing, at the 
very least, 1763 through the Articles of Confederation, the Constitution, and even the ratification 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, provides remarkably unambiguous support for the proposition that 
the original understanding of the Framers was that Indian affairs must be dealt with in the context 
of tribal political relationships with the federal government.”). 
80.  Cynthia Cumfer, Local Origins of National Indian Policy:  Cherokee and Tennessean 
Ideas about Sovereignty and Nationhood, 1790-1811, 23 EARLY REPUBLIC J. 21, 45 (2003). 
81.  See, Frickey, supra note 11, at 472 (commenting that Justice Kennedy’s separate opinion 
in Lara indicates that for him “the nature of American citizenship seems inconsistent with the 
existence of a third category of sovereigns within the borders of the United States that are not 
limited by the Constitution.”).  
82.  Papillon, supra note 5, at 3 (“Indigenous peoples have an ambiguous status in Canada 
and American federalism.  Neither constitution recognized Indigenous peoples either as fully 
independent polities or as constituent entities of the federal compact.”).  See also Skibine, supra, 
note 33, at 18 (“The court is free to develop, as eloquently put by the late Phillip Frickey, its own 
‘Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism.”) (quoting Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our 
Age of Colonialism, 109 YALE L.J. 1 (1999)). See also id. (describing the Court’s approach to 
dealing with the “nettlesome challenges of modern Indian law,” as one “almost completely shorn 
of any concern for constitutional and historical doctrine, the role of a limited judiciary, and respect 
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domestic regulation, continues to haunt federal Indian jurisprudence83 and 
has left every tribe vulnerable to outside incursions.  Despite the endurance 
of the doctrine of tribal sovereignty,84 there is a manifest need to reconcile 
the “Supreme Court’s recently expressed concerns about extra-
constitutional governmental authority” with “historical and normative 
considerations” supporting independent tribal self-government.85  Yet no 
clear guidance has emerged from the scholarship regarding the integration 
of a third category of sovereign into the middle of what is clearly a  
two-tiered federal system.86 
III.  WHY IT IS HARD TO INTEGRATE TRIBES INTO OUR 
CONSTITUTIONAL BINARY SOVEREIGN STRUCTURE 
The diversity, number of tribes, their unique forms of internal 
governance and cultural traditions, the largely toxic shared historical 
experience with them, non-Indian skepticism about Indian capabilities, 
competition between Indians and non-Indians over valuable resources, and 
even the concept of independent tribal sovereign nations create obstacles to 
inserting tribes into the Constitution’s dual sovereign structure.  While none 
of these problems creates a barrier that cannot be scaled, each figures into 
the choice and shape of potential constitutional solutions to tribal 
powerlessness. 
A. TRIBAL DIVERSITY AND THE NUMBER OF TRIBES AS WELL AS 
 THEIR UNIQUENESS POSE A CHALLENGE TO DESIGNING A 
 
for those who were here first.”) (quoting FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BROKEN LANDSCAPE:  INDIANS, 
INDIAN TRIBES, AND THE CONSTITUTION 229 (2009)).  
83.  Frickey, supra note 11, at 472 (quoting U.S. v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 226 (2004) (Thomas, 
J., concurring)) (“We might find that the Federal Government cannot regulate the tribes through 
ordinary domestic legislation and simultaneously maintain that the tribes are sovereigns in any 
meaningful sense.  But until we begin to analyze these questions honestly and rigorously, the 
confusion that I have identified will continue to haunt our cases.”).  
84.  Robertson, supra note 6, at 357 (commenting that the endurance of the doctrine of tribal 
sovereignty may be “in part attributable to its powerful intuitive attractiveness as a means of 
ventilating a rather ill-defined residuum of uniquely Indian interests that have survived conquest 
and subjugation.”). 
85.  Price, supra note 23, at 660-61 (making this point with respect to both tribal and 
territorial governments).  While neither tribes nor territories have direct representation in the 
federal government, their histories and traditions are “markedly different from those of the 
American polity at large.”  Id. at 662. 
86.  Clement, supra note 11, at 664.  See also Ericson & Snow, supra note 6, at 487 (“The 
tribes’ unique position as a congressionally acknowledged and judicially and historically 
confirmed, third unit of government within the nation but not included in the federal system 
necessitates a conceptual structure in which the relationships arise out of a recognition of the 
stakes of the various parties involved.”).  
         
2014] A POSSIBLE SOLUTION 35 
 
 CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM SOLUTION 
There are 566 federally recognized American Indian tribes and 326 
federally recognized American Indian reservations.87  Tribes vary widely in 
their traditions, languages, governance structures, size, membership rules, 
land base, geographic location, and the extent to which they are integrated, 
if at all, into the surrounding non-Indian society.88  Moreover, nearly half of 
the United States total Indian population lives in cities and have very 
different lives and needs from those Indians who live on reservations, even 
though many urban Indians keep some kind of contact with their home 
reservation.89  This makes finding a constitutional federalism solution that 
fits all tribes equally very difficult. 
The diverse nature of American Indian tribes and their capacity to 
reinvent and reform themselves in response to external events also prevents 
them from developing a common perspective on political issues and from 
organizing into an effective voting bloc.  Since elected officials are not 
dependent on Indian votes to get elected, they need not understand their 
Indian constituents or their needs.  Powerful legislators and influential  
non-Indian interest groups can easily overwhelm Indian interests in 
Congress.90  Any federalism solution that tries to recalibrate this political 
 
87.  Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, 
www.bia.gov/FAQs/.  
88.  In this respect, United States Indian tribes are not much different from Canada’s 
aboriginal peoples, who live in bands of varying size and assimilation, scattered throughout the 
provinces. Abele & Prince, supra note 13, at 571 (“Besides differences due to economic 
circumstances, geography, and demographics, there are large differences in political history, 
ideology, and practice among the various Aboriginal nations and peoples.”). 
89.  Dorris, supra note 27, at 59 (“Today nearly one half of the total Native American 
population in the United States could be classified as urban, though studies strongly suggest that 
the majority of these migrants maintain significant ties with their home communities.”).  Cf. 
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 432–34 (2006) (noting “different 
characteristics, needs, and interests” of urban and rural Latino communities”). 
90.  W. Dale Mason, Tribes and States:  A New Era in Intergovernmental Affairs, 28 
PUBLIUS 111, 115  (1998) (“[M]ost lawmakers, whether in the Congress or in state legislatures, do 
not have to understand Indian issues because they don’t have to; they do not depend on Indian 
voters to get reelected.  This in turn means that powerful legislators and powerful non-Indian 
interest groups can often overpower Indian interests.”).  In contrast, in the early days of the 
republic, “the fear of Indians organizing as political entities hovered as a cloud over the Founders 
for decades.”  Fletcher, supra note 46, at 165.  See also David A. Super, Protecting Civil Rights in 
the Shadows, 123 YALE L.J. 2806, 2813 (2014) (for a minority group to either integrate into the 
base of a political party or exercise any power to “swing” that party’s positions, it “must be 
sufficiently numerous to interest the political parties . . .  [and] one or both parties must actually 
want the group’s support”).  The groups must act like a bloc to be able to convince the dominant 
political party that it “will actually swing en mass.”  Id. (italics appearing in original).  All three 
criteria are difficult for Indian tribes to meet.  Differences among the tribes may also make it 
difficult for a single or even a few “opinion leaders” to emerge who can speak for all or most 
tribes and who are recognized as such.  Id.  at 2815. 
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imbalance to favor Indians more, or at least to level the playing field with 
non-Indians, may be viewed by non-Indians as unwelcome. 
Additionally, because American Indians are “a geographically 
dispersed and culturally diverse minority, in addition to being numerically 
small” in relation to the total population, they do not form a “social 
stratum” that can become a single oppositional class.91  This can be 
contrasted with countries like Mexico where a large Indian population’s 
opposition to the richer and more socially superior non-Indian populations 
is easily reduced to a classist paradigm and gains traction for that very 
reason.92  American tribes do not constitute a broad base of “the politically 
and economically repressed”93 that can define itself en masse in opposition 
to the dominant culture. Indian tribes in the United States are too different, 
too small, too isolated, and too geographically dispersed to develop an 
oppositional political and economic posture on their own behalf.  Therefore, 
unless the proposed federalism approach advantages tribes in some way, 
they may be politically incapable of enhancing their power on their own. 
 Even if the government could transform these “relic non-Western 
societies” into political entities that could then be integrated into the federal 
bureaucratic hierarchy in some way,94 there are tribes who have no interest 
in doing this because it would mean that they would remain “in a fixed 
position of subordination in a public bureaucratic hierarchy.”95  This 
internal schism based on differing tribal perceptions of their sovereign 
status presents another challenge to finding a one-size-fits-all federalism 
solution. 
B. THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE WITH INDIAN TRIBES 
 HAS LED TO NEGATIVE PERCEPTIONS ABOUT TRIBES 
The United States’ early historical experience with Indian tribes 
formed the template for future relations with them until the present.  It also 
helped form enduring popular negative stereotypes of Indians that first 
found solid purchase in early American literature and later in Hollywood 
caricatures of Indians. 
 
91.  Guillemin, supra note 20, at 327. 
92.  Id. 
93.  Id. at 327.  Guillemin notes that even Indians who have migrated to cities “remain 
marginal, relative to the integration of other minorities.” Id.   
94.  Id.  at 328. 
95.  Id.  at 329 (“As a dispersed minority, their best assurance of political representation 
comes from their corporate status as tribes, yet this same status guarantees a fixed position of 
subordination in a public bureaucratic hierarchy.”).  
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The political origins of the United States were quite different from 
those of Canada, a country with a comparably sized and diverse aboriginal, 
native population.  The United States arose out of a rebellion, at the 
conclusion of which a constitution was produced and was almost 
immediately amended in 1791 to add the Bill of Rights. Canada, on the 
other hand, did not acquire the right to amend its Constitution until 1982, 
and its Constitution has remained “a work-in-progress” for decades.  This 
created an opportunity for Canada’s aboriginal peoples to use the possibility 
of constitutional change to improve their situation.96  Furthermore, the 1982 
Canadian Constitution recognized existing aboriginal and treaty rights of its 
native peoples.97  As a result, aboriginal self-government in Canada can 
only be exercised “within the framework of the Canadian Constitution,” and 
“the particulars of self-government must be negotiated with the federal and 
provincial or territorial governments.”98  There is no comparable provision 
in the United States Constitution, and the resulting experience with the 
federal and state government for American tribes has correspondingly 
occurred outside the Constitution.  Also, unlike the United States where 
treating with Indian tribes ended in 1871,99 the Canadian government 
continued to negotiate treaties with their aboriginal peoples until 1927.100  
Despite the incorporation of Canada’s aboriginal peoples, now denominated 
First Nations, into the Canadian Constitution and their continued posture as 
treating nations, Canada faces the same challenge of “accommodating the 
extremely heterogeneous Aboriginal order of government” into a federal 
system of government.101  Both countries also provided “for the existence 
 
96.  Abele & Prince, supra note 13, at 569 (“Canada was not forged as the result of a 
rebellion of British colonies, of course, but rather emerged stepwise, with full national 
independence (the capacity to amend the Constitution domestically) not achieved until 1982.  The 
fact that the Canadian Constitution was a work-in-progress for so many decades has meant that the 
possibility of Aboriginal people in Canada using constitutional change to advance their position 
persisted for over a century.  The 1982 constitutional provisions reflect and entrench a more 
“modern” vision of the place of Aboriginal people in Canada than would have appeared had their 
place been permanently entrenched at Confederation in 1867.”).  
97.  Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 112 (U.K.) (“The 
existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and 
affirmed.”). 
98.  Bilosi, supra note 1, at 243 (internal quotations and citations omitted).  See also 
Guillemin, supra note 20, at 323 (“The French, later immigrants who chose to stay in Canada, the 
Metis, and Indians were permitted considerable cultural autonomy . . . The lack of Dominion Bill 
of Rights (until 1960) permitted the development of a ‘vertical mosaic’ of diverse minorities under 
British Canadian rule, with Indians, as the least Europeanized group, relegated to the lowest social 
order.”). 
99.  Guillemin, supra note 20, at 323. 
100.  Id. 
101.  Abele & Prince, supra note 13, at 570 (commenting on “the increasingly pressing 
challenge of accommodating the extremely heterogeneous Aboriginal order of government into 
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of culturally and racially anomalous tribes within their national boundaries 
and chose to do so by confining them to reservations.”102 
Another distinguishing feature from the Canadian aboriginal 
experience is that the growth of the United States depended on, and 
continues to depend on, displacement of tribes from their land base.103  
Indeed, according to Ablavsky, “using Indians to justify the power of the 
new national state . . . elevated conquest of Indians to a constitutional 
principle.”104  While Canada, where there was less economic pressure for 
removal of Indians, negotiated a largely peaceful transfer of native lands to 
the government, the transfer of Indian lands in the United States, 
particularly in the west, was accomplished principally through military 
force.105  The resistance of the western tribes to these military removal 
campaigns resulted in Indians being cast as the enemy; when ultimately 
defeated, the federal government and non-Indian citizens considered tribes 
to be conquered nations, subdued, but still alien.106 
 
federalism.  Specifically, we argue that at some point in the not-too-distant future, Canadians will 
have to decide how Aboriginal self-governments are to be integrated in or associated with 
federalism, and what to do about the likelihood that those arrangements suitable for one 
substantial body of Aboriginal opinion may not be suitable for another.”) (emphasis in original). 
For example, the Mohawk Tribe in Canada has refused to “buy into” what they see as essentially 
foreign institutions.  See also Tebben, supra note 7, at 320 (“But while the majority of Canadians 
wish to see native societies integrated within the social and political framework they have 
created, Mohawks reject the idea of buying into what are essentially foreign institutions.  They 
have recognized the political realities and the necessities of cooperating with Canadian 
authorities to create institutions and arrangements which will afford the community control over 
its internal organization, expanded jurisdictional powers, and more flexible external 
relationships.  Canadians perceive these as ultimate objectives; Mohawks assuredly do not.”). 
102.  Guillemin, supra note 20, at 321 (both countries “seized upon the segregation of 
aboriginal tribes as a suitable means of isolating a non-European population while preserving the 
honor of the nation.”). 
103.  Id.  at 320 (contrasting
 
seventeenth century displacement of eastern Indian tribes by 
British settlers with seventeenth century New France where there was “less competition for land,” 
the seigneurial system of land tenure was less intensive it its use of the land for agriculture, and 
“less exclusive” in maintaining boundaries than either in France or New England.  Noting also 
that the multiplicity of economies—agriculture, fishing, fur trading—“presented few impediments 
to the integration of French-men and Indian”).  See also id. (“[T]here was no concerted military 
action on the part of the French to displace or destroy Indians.  The westward expansion of the fur 
trade in fact relied on the cooperation of woodland tribes.”). 
104.  Ablavsky, supra note 8, at 1008 (“Although few Federalists were rabid Indian-haters of 
the sort common on the frontier, they had sold the Constitution by promising to use federal power 
against Indians rather than, as Madison had anticipated, to restrain states.”). 
105.  Guillemin, supra note 20, at 322 (“The peaceful surrender of native lands negotiated by 
the Canadian government stands in sharp contrast to the military resistance encountered by the 
United States government.”). 
106.  See Fletcher, supra note 46, at 167 (“As John Jay wrote in Federalist No. 3 ‘[n]ot a 
single Indian war has yet been produced by aggressions of the present federal government, feeble 
as it is; but there are several instances of Indian hostilities having been provoked by the improper 
conduct of individual States.’ As a result, Hamilton argued in Federalist No. 25 that the danger 
from nations such as “Britain, Spain, and . . .  the Indian nations . . . is therefore common [to the 
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The American historical experience with Indian tribes provided a basis 
for a perception of Indians as primitive, conquered, and alien.107  These 
images abounded in books at the Founding and continue as part of our 
culture, even today.108  Even Hollywood contributed and continues to 
contribute to the stereotype of Indians as simple-minded, brutal, uncivilized 
savages whose existence was seen as a “threat to the dominant class”—
“Native Americans were cut down to a simplistic ‘other’ in film, serving as 
a bloodthirsty stumbling block to settlers, who represented the valiant, 
legitimate force of civilization, ordained by God to overcome barbarism.”109  
Given the superiority of the majority culture, Indians were expected to 
disappear.110  The fact that they instead persisted may have prevented any 
constructive thinking about how to integrate tribes into the country’s 
governance structure until countervailing mores demanded something be 
done to improve their economic and social situation. 
Reservations are federal enclaves within the boundaries of states.  
Some tribal lands contain mineral and renewable resources—e.g. water—of 
great economic value, which do not confine themselves within geopolitical 
 
entire United States].”) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 3 (John Jay), No. 25 (Alexander 
Hamilton)). 
107.  See Ablavsky, supra note 8, at 1007 (characterizing images of Indians as “savages” 
became part of the rhetoric of the Federalist Party in its quest for a strong national government).  
See also Basham, supra note 24, at 555 (discussing how Hollywood filmmakers took to heart the 
famous misquote by General Sheridan that “The only good Indian is a dead Indian” and how 
‘[a]dvancing the stereotype of the one-dimensional, brutal, uncivilized savage served to justify the 
near genocide that settlers had caused, legitimating the settler as the dominant culture and the 
cowboy as the hero.’”). 
108.  See generally Babcock, supra note 15.  See also Basham, supra note 24, at 549 
(“Whether portrayed as violent savages bent solely on war or as nobly ignorant spiritualists, 
Native American characters on screen have been portrayed as inferior and (literally or narratively) 
subservient to the robust, authoritative American cowboy.”).  Indeed, one might argue that the 
continued under-representation of Indians in this country’s “central democratic institutions” 
demeans “their dignity and worth as citizens” and “reinforces existing inaccurate understandings” 
of the worth of Indians as a particular group in American society. Knight, supra note 66, at 1112 
(making this point with respect to Canada’s aboriginal peoples). 
109.  Basham, supra note 24, at 554. 
110.  Dorris, supra note 27, at 47 (The “expected mass demise [of Indians] profoundly 
affected the nature of early European perceptions and consequent official dealings with Indians, 
and thus had a lasting impact, through the precedents and language of the accords that marked the 
establishment of relations between Indians and Europeans, on all later legal relationships.”).  See 
also Cumfer, supra note 80, at 43 (“Westering people in Tennessee, as elsewhere, struggled to 
shape this ambiguous conceptual space. Some early adventurers saw the indigenous inhabitants as 
more akin to animals than human attributing to them no rights of nationhood.  They advocated a 
doctrine of extermination.”); Id. (“The majority of transmontane before 1790 did not agree. Most 
settlers perceived the indigenous peoples as a separate political sovereignty—a nation—with 
many advancing a doctrine of conquest and others a policy of accommodation and civilization.  
Although these inhabitants considered Indians to be “uncivilized,” they did not assign any 
meaning from this characterization to the doctrine of sovereignty or nationhood.”).  
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boundaries.  “Governments with common territorial boundaries are likely to 
clash over authority to govern a resource of common interest.”111  States 
and their residents, who compete with Indians over the use of and profit 
from these resources, “tend to view Indian control of resources as a zero-
sum game; tribal control and profits mean a loss of control and profit by the 
state.”112  Additionally, income earned in Indian Country, for example from 
gambling or the tax-free sale of cigarettes, is a friction point for many states 
that house these reservations.113 
At no time has the federal government loosened its control of Indian 
lands or diverged from the basic understanding that tribes have only 
usufructuary rights in those lands and no right to engage in any independent 
corporate enterprise on tribal lands.114  This often leaves reservations 
without an independent economic base except for federal grants.115  
Development of industrial resources and large scale farming “are blocked 
on several fronts,” and “federal priorities in land use, a lack of managerial 
and technical expertise on the part of Indians, and unsuccessful competition 
with state and local interest” have further deprived tribes of gaining any 
economic independence.116  The government’s paternal attitude toward 
tribal development and management of their own resources not only 
deprives tribes of the opportunity to develop relevant technical skills and 
knowledge, but also perversely corroborates the false impression that 
Indians are incapable of managing their own resources and becoming 
economically independent. 
Tribes and their members are not well understood by non-Indians; they 
are seen as alien and uncivilized.117  The status of Indians “as a racial and 
 
111.  Mason, supra note 90, at 115. 
112.  Id. 
113.  Id.  (“For nearly 20 years, the most broadly contentious issue between tribes and states 
has been gambling operations run on Indian lands by tribal governments.  This issue has 
demonstrated all of the above-listed sources of conflict.”). 
114.  Guillemin, supra note 20, at 323-24.  See also Cumfer, supra note 80, at 44 (“White 
rhetoric reflected the shift from Cherokee to white land discourse that whittled away rights in a 
movement that reconstituted the Indian sovereign unit from a “nation” to a “tribe” with territory, 
or worse, to “tenants” with mere claims.  Although Congress referred to Native-American 
corporate bodies as “tribes” in the 1780s, Tennesseans rarely spoke of “tribes” during that decade 
to refer to the Indian nations.”).  
115.  Guillemin, supra note 20, at 325. 
116.  Id.  This experience is quite different than the experience of Canadian aboriginal 
peoples where the expectation is that with a little prodding Canada’s native populations will 
develop communities comparable to other ethnic groups.  Id.  at 326. 
117.   See Knight, supra note 66, at 1113 (“Parliament is the face of Canadian democracy, 
and the exclusion of Aboriginal people from that body undermines their human dignity and 
threatens to perpetuate stereotypes about that group held by other members of society.”).  
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cultural minority causes discrimination in most off-reservation contexts.”118  
According to Jeanne Guillemin, “[w]e have just begun to understand the 
interplay of important variables in determining the level of tolerance for 
‘aliens’ within a nation . . . .”119  The strangeness of Indians challenges the 
ability and willingness of a European-based democracy, like the United 
States, to understand a non-Western social unit like a tribe,120 let alone 
incorporate tribes into the Constitution as some kind of co-equal 
sovereign.121 
C. INDEPENDENT INDIAN SOVEREIGN NATIONS 
The concept of Indian tribal nationhood and tribal sovereignty, while 
important to Indians for their self-identification as well as to provide legal 
support for their uniqueness, may be a barrier to their integration into the 
American constitutional system.  If tribes are separate nations, it becomes 
more difficult to integrate them into the political structure of the United 
States122 and raises the specter of tribal members with divided loyalties.123  
 
118.  Guillemin, supra note 20, at 329. 
119.  Id. 
120.  Id.  (“Should options for tribal autonomy be taken seriously, another difficult question 
may arise, that is, how far the government will go to support genuinely independent communities. 
The question also becomes one of how well a Western democracy can comprehend so  
non-Western a social unit as a tribe.”). 
121.  Tebben, supra note 7, at 320 (“The conceptualization of a constitutionally 
sanctioned, three-sovereign government that includes tribes within the structure of 
American government may represent a stepping stone to a higher and independent 
tribal nation status.”).  For this reason Tebben advocates what she calls “trifederalism,” in which 
the tribes continue to function as “domestic rather than ‘independent international’ sovereigns,” 
but that they need to have their constitutional status “as nations within a nation” clarified. Id.  at 
320-21. 
122.  Menno Boldt & J. Anthony Long, Tribal Traditions and European-Western Political 
Ideologies:  The Dilemma of Canada’s Native Indians, 17 CANADIAN J. POL. SCI. 537, 552 n.47 
(1984) (explaining that “on moral and practical grounds sovereignty cannot exist for a ‘nation’ 
which is a minority within a state.  Because, if every national group in the world were assumed to 
be entitled to sovereign statehood it would create chaos and threaten the authority of existing 
states.”).  But see id. at 549 (The concept of “two or more social systems and associated 
constitutional networks within one political system” is captured in the concept of “consociational 
arrangements.”). See also KENNETH D. MCRAE, CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY: POLITICAL 
ACCOMMODATION IN SEGMENTED SOCIETIES 253-99 (1974) (consociational arrangements 
“allow[] for the presence of several nations within one sovereign state.”). 
123.  See Thomas Flanagan, The Sovereignty and Nationhood of Canadian Indians:  A 
Comment on Boldt and Long, 18 CANADIAN J. POL. SCI. 367, 371 (1985) (saying “Hans Kohn 
writes that ‘nationalism is a state of mind in which the supreme loyalty of the individual is felt to 
be due the nation-state’”) (quoting HANS KOHN, NATIONALISM: ITS MEANING AND HISTORY 9 
(rev. ed. 1965)). See also Boldt & Long, supra note 122, at 551 (a nation reflects “a psychological 
bond that joins a people and differentiates it, in the subconscious conviction of its members, from 
all other people in a most vital way.”) (quoting Walker Connor, A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is 
an Ethnic Group is a . . . , 1 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 379 (1978)).  
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It is also unnecessary for determining if tribes deserve coequal status with 
states.124 
The concept of tribal sovereignty protects and preserves tribes as “a 
distinct cultural and political unit.”125  Tribal political institutions “foster 
and protect a unique group identity that stems from place-based wisdom 
and culture.”126  But at the same time, “[t]he insistence on the right to 
special status distinguishes Indian ‘activists’ from those of virtually every 
other minority group, and is often a bone of contention between Native 
Americans and their potential supporters.”127 
Similarly, the fact that Indians carry dual citizenship makes Indians 
different from Americans whose families have immigrated to the United 
States but who are now citizens of the United States; Indians owe allegiance 
to a sovereign entity other than the United States.128  Because Indians are 
dual citizens, they “claim and exercise citizenship simultaneously in Native 
nations and in the United States.”129  Biolsi sees Indians’ dual citizenship as 
recognition of a “hybrid political space in which the simultaneous existence 
of two nations in the same physical space is naturalized.”130  However, he 
also see this situation as a “zero-sum game of political participation in 
which time spent participating in the American political system is time 
taken away from participating in the tribal political system.”131 
 
124.  Flanagan, supra note 123, at 369. (“The nation-state is the paradigmatic form of 
political organization in the modern world. Whether Indians are nations and in what sense, are 
questions of cardinal importance both to them and to Canada.”).  Flanagan notes that in Canada 
the claim of Indians to nation-status is tied to political demands for self-rule on Indian lands. See 
id. at 370 (“The claim of Indians to be nations has arisen as part of a new vocabulary whose main 
terms are nation, sovereignty, self-determination, and aboriginal rights.  Expressing the 
quintessentially political demand for self-rule of Indians on a fixed land base, this is the 
vocabulary of national self-determination and international law.”).  
125.  Krakoff, supra note 11, at 1193 (“Sovereignty protects the ability of the group, as a 
distinct cultural and political unit, to continue to exist.  Indeed, the other strands—culture, 
wisdom, and land—both depend on and foster the continuation of group identity.”). 
126.  Id.  at 1194. 
127.  Dorris, supra note 27, at 61. 
128.  Krakoff, supra note 11, at 1194 (“Tribal sovereignty serves to perpetuate that sense of 
being Navajo as distinct from just being an American Indian by ethnicity.”).  See also Dorris, 
supra note 27, at 57 (“No other group in this country exists in this dichotomous position . . .  but 
from a Native American point of view, the advantage of dual citizenship are theirs by legal 
contract and congressional ratification.”).  
129.  Biolsi, supra note 1, at 240. 
130.  Id.  at 252. 
131.  Id.  at 253 (quoting Robert B. Porter, The Demise of the Ongweboweh and the Rise of 
the Native Americans:  Redressing the Genocidal Act of Forcing American Citizenship Upon 
Indigenous Peoples, 15 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 107, 169-70 (1999)).  Porter explains that 
“American citizenship . . . [for] Indigenous peoples undermines the loyalty that one has to one’s 
Indigenous nation, [and] as the commitment of Indigenous citizens to their Indigenous nation 
diminishes, dual citizenship will have the effect of destroying the Indigenous nation from within.”  
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“Granting too much significance to sovereignty and statehood may 
obscure the real interests of parties in sharing or dividing power,” making it 
harder to form new relationships “among and within states, governments, 
and peoples.”132  Martin Papillon also identifies the push by American 
tribes for recognition of their inherent sovereignty as a “zero sum game,” in 
which tribes engage in constant battles with states to preserve their 
sovereignty.133  “[B]ecause sovereignty is not absolute, recognizing or 
reasserting tribal sovereignty does not automatically imply that every tribal 
act supersedes any inconsistent act by another government,” so the 
achievement of separate sovereign status may achieve less than hoped.134  
On the other hand, the possession of internal sovereignty—the capacity to 
govern themselves and their lands—that is not dependent on an external 
source like the federal government has empowered tribes to challenge the 
status quo imposed by the institution of federalism.135 
Thomas Flanagan views claims for nationhood by Canada’s aboriginal 
peoples as equivalent to a demand for “a share of sovereignty in the federal 
state”—a state that would be legally analogous to Canadian provinces, as 
these aboriginal bands would be entitled to full self-government in 
“constitutionally defined respects.”136  Under Flanagan’s vision of what 
aboriginal nationhood would look like, Canada’s First Nations would 
determine their own “citizenship” and would provide their own members 
with almost all the services that federal and provincial governments now 
deliver to native groups.137  The actions of aboriginal governments would 
be exempt from judicial review, including challenges implicating some civil 
 
Porter, supra note 131, at 169-70.  See also Biolsi, supra note 1, at 253 (“In the absence of the 
need to concern themselves with Indigenous self-government, urban Indians have become 
increasingly preoccupied with their status as minorities in the American political system and the 
racism and discrimination that is inflicted upon Indigenous peoples by virtue of that status.”) 
(quoting Porter, supra note 130, at 174).  
132.  Hurst Hannum, Sovereignty and Its Relevance to Native Americans in the Twenty-First 
Century, 23 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 487, 492 (1999).  See also id. (noting that “the increasing 
complexity and interdependence of the modern world require us to look beyond the stark extremes 
of ‘statehood or nothing,’ or sovereignty versus dependency.”). 
133.  Papillon, supra note 5, at 15. Papillon contrasts this with Canada’s First Nations who 
engage in negotiations with both the federal and provincial governments to have “their  
rights-based jurisdictional claims recognized within the parameters of the Canadian Constitution, 
as an addition to existing authorities.” Id.  Indeed, “[i]ndigenous self-government in Canada is 
more about constitutional rights and less about the recognition of external sovereignties.” Id.  
134.  Hannum, supra note 132, at 494. 
135.  Papillon, supra note 5, at 6. 
136.  Flanagan, supra note 123, at 372.  He sees in these claims the seeds of “treaty 
federalism.” Id.  
137.  However, many of the attributes of separate nationhood for aboriginal groups listed by 
Flanagan are those already possessed by tribes in the United States, such as control of tribal 
membership qualifications, provision of services, and full self-government. 
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liberty protected by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.138  
Flanagan worries that granting tribal bands nationhood would be equivalent 
to their seceding from the Canadian federal structure.139  The result would 
be the creation of aboriginal “enclaves within the Canadian state,”140 which 
would turn Canada into a “multination state” resulting in “institutional 
disarray.”141  There is little reason to think that the consequence of granting 
American tribes separate nationhood status would be different. 
The diversity of tribes, a lamentable shared historical experience, and 
even the push for separate nation status create serious challenges to 
integrating tribes into the Constitution.  But none is fatally debilitating.  The 
next part of this article discusses why there is reason to believe that the 
concept of federalism is sufficiently malleable to incorporate tribes as co-
equal sovereigns. 
 
138.  Flanagan, supra note 123, at 372. 
139.  Id.  (“The essence of a federal system is that the citizen is directly affected by two 
governments in a scheme of divided jurisdiction. By this criterion, Indian First Nations would 
virtually secede from Canadian federalism.”).  See also Andrew Oldenquist, Ethnicity and 
Sovereignty, 54 STUD. IN E. EUROPEAN THOUGHT, NATIONALISM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES 271, 
272 (2002) (“‘Nationalism’ is the correct word for ethnic separatism.”).  Oldenquist, however, 
notes that groups with clear cultural/ethnic identity can support the idea of “ethnic” secession.  Id. 
at 271. 
140.  Flanagan, supra note 123, at 373-74 (“They would become enclaves within the 
Canadian state, receiving fiscal subsidies but in other respects constituting imperia in imperio. 
This departure from federalism fundamentally stems from the conceptualization of Indian 
communities as nations.”).  Another reason Flanagan notes that “nationhood” makes no sense, at 
least for Canada’s aboriginal peoples, is numbers if each tribal unit is counted separately as 
opposed to aggregated into a single whole.  See id. at 373 (“The first problem is that of numbers.  
According to Rupert Emerson, ‘it is a generally plausible assumption that a nation involves 
societies of substantial magnitude . . . from a million or so people to hundreds of millions.’  There 
are slightly more than 300,000 status Indians in Canada, plus an indeterminate number of 
nonstatus Indians and Metis, so that they might add up to a nation if they were all counted 
together; but current claims go in precisely the opposite direction.  Each tribe, or even each band, 
the opposite is said to be a nation.”) (quoting RUPER EMERSON, FROM EMPIRE TO NATION 99 
(1962)). 
141.  Id.  at 374 (explaining that “it would be ironic indeed to casually transform Canada into 
a multinational state.  From this perspective, it is as important to be clear about symbolic matters 
like terminology as it is to evolve workable institutional arrangements for native peoples. 
Symbolism incompatible with the Canadian political order will inevitably tend to produce 
institutional disarray, for accepted symbols form the matrix of ideas in which public policy is 
made.”).  
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IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONCEPT OF FEDERALISM IS 
SUFFICIENTLY FLEXIBLE TO ACCOMMODATE AN 
ADDITIONAL SOVEREIGN INSIDE THE SAME NATIONAL 
BORDER 
Tribal sovereignty advocates want “coequal sovereignty, not nested, 
hierarchical sovereignty or a relationship of scaled sovereignty, in which 
the ‘highest’ sovereign encompasses the ‘lower’ sovereigns—as in the 
relationship between the states and the federal government.”142  This part of 
the article examines whether the Constitution’s bivalent federal design is 
sufficiently flexible to incorporate a third co-equal sovereign within the 
same topographical perimeter.143 
One indication of flexibility in the constitutional federalism design is 
apparent in the shifting and blurring of the boundaries between federal and 
state governments as a result of negotiated solutions to jurisdictional 
conflicts between the two sovereigns.144  This “interpretative bargaining” 
can redistribute “authority at the uncertain margins of state and federal 
power” in ways that do not necessarily conform to a strict divide between 
jurisdictions.145  Erin Ryan explains how states bargain with the federal 
government for a share of federal capacity over “financial resources, 
freedom from otherwise operative legal rules, or legal authority to resolve a 
 
142.  Biolsi, supra note 1, at 246. 
143.  Papillon, supra note 5, at 1 (commenting on the “relative plasticity of federal systems 
in adapting to the social fabric of a polity, thus ensuring both the stability of the federal union and 
its capacity to adapt to the ongoing tensions created by ethnic and linguistic divisions.”).  See also 
Boldt & Long, supra note 122, at 549-50 (proposing that “ethnic communities meeting certain 
criteria should be considered as unities (corporate bodies) with moral rights and legal status 
accorded them as groups rather than as individuals” and that these ethnic communities, in addition 
to states, “are entitled to be regarded as right-and-duty bearing entities.”) (citing Vernon Van 
Dyke, Human Rights and the Rights of Groups, 18 AM. J. POL. SC. 725-41 (1974)).  According to 
Richard Monette, “very few scholars unabashedly argue that tribes should strive for a structured 
relationship on our domestic plane.”  Monette, supra note 42, at 631 n.89.  He argues instead that 
tribes should be treated as states “for purposes of applying the logic of our Federalism,” which 
“provides a wholly new direction for federal Indian law.” Id.  at 633.  But see Skibine, supra note 
43, at 693 (“A more interesting question, however, is whether Congress could constitutionally, or 
would politically, incorporate the tribes within Our Federalism under a third sphere of sovereignty 
without also making the Fourteenth Amendment applicable to Indian tribes.”). 
144.  An obvious benefit of finding “territorial borders . . . more permeable and territoriality 
is less constraining” is the reduction of “the historical reluctance of states to embrace the concept 
of multiple ‘peoples’ within a state’s borders . . . .”  Parrish, supra note 68, at 306 (citing, as an 
example of this, the “globalization of labor and capital,” which “renders the traditional concept of 
a nation-state—with one distinct, if not imagined, culture—to be unattainable.”). 
145.  Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1, 135 (2011).  See also id. at 135 
(recognizing “how interpretive bargaining helps allocate authority at the uncertain margins of state 
and federal power provides a new lens for understanding the uniquely collaborative process of 
American governance.”). 
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collective action problem among the states.”146  The more the federal 
government depends on states to achieve its objectives, the more “leverage” 
the states have in bargaining for increased authority and/or resources and 
the less likely the superior sovereign will deny them what they want.147 
Another example of porous geopolitical boundaries between federal 
and state governments is what Lilas Jones Jarding calls relational 
federalism:  a situation in which there are “fluid and dynamic” relationships 
among governing entities with overlapping jurisdictions, which are not 
“clearly agreed upon or set forth in defining documents.”148  In relational 
federalism, “power and responsibility for governance are shared among 
different units, but without clear territorial boundaries or a clear national-
subnational division of governmental power.”149  She views tribal-state 
interactions as consistent with the concept of relational federalism even 
though those interactions are not strictly national-subnational or territorial 
models of federalism.150 
The concepts of “government-to-government” and “tribes-as-states” 
are examples of how strict geographic boundaries between tribes and the 
two recognized sovereigns have blurred to the point of creating some form 
of shared sovereignty in a single geographic space.151  These governing 
relationships came about in the United States in the late 1980s when many 
federal pollution control laws were amended to add provisions that treated 
tribes as though they were states for purposes of delegated programmatic 
 
146.  Id.  at 76. See also id.  at 87 (states also bargain over regulatory capacity and 
principle—”the normative leverage that federalism values themselves exert on the negotiation.”).  
Ryan also notes that:  
[N]egotiated governance is not just a de facto response to regulatory uncertainty about 
who should decide, but can be, in and of itself, a constitutionally legitimate way of 
deciding.  More than just a means to an end, carefully crafted federalism bargaining 
can also be a principled means of allocating state and federal authority in realms of 
concurrent regulatory interest.  
Id.  at 102. 
147.  The Supreme Court’s modern federalism jurisprudence “privileges state sovereignty in 
order to promote efficiency and intergovernmental competition, check governmental tyranny, 
draw on pluralism and the experimental values of decentralized governance, and reinforce 
community and democratic participation.”  Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism:   
Federal-Local Collaboration in an Era of State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959, 961 (2007). 
148.  Lilias Jones Jarding, Tribal-State Relations involving Land and Resources in the  
Self-Determination Era, 57 POL. RES. Q. 295, 295 (2004).  Jarding adds that the relational 
federalism concept “focuses on relationships among government entities that share power without 
limiting the nature of those relationships.”  Id.  at 302 
149.  Id.  at 295 
150.  Id.  
151.  Biolsi, supra note 1, at 246.  Biolsi remarks that the government-to-government model 
has “some remarkable parallels” to the process in Australia of recognizing “Native Title” and also 
the recognized right of Aboriginal groups to co-manage national parks.  Id. 
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authority.152  Each of these gives federally recognized tribes153 some 
official role as “stakeholders” in state and federal policy-making.154   
Inter-jurisdiction conflicts reflecting different state and tribal interests and 
priorities, which have plagued these areas of overlapping authority, have 
spawned mechanisms for inter-jurisdictional collaboration and 
coordination. Examples of these are procedures for formal consultation, 
framework agreements, and protocols for the resolution of conflicts.155  The 
result has been the creation of a “multilevel governance regime” that 
parallels existing mechanisms governing intergovernmental relations 
between states and tribal governments.156 
The fact that there are mid and/or overlapping spaces between federal 
and state governments is not surprising as adaption to different situations is 
an attribute of federalism.  Federalism allows for “interjurisdictional 
innovation,” some examples of which are discussed above, as well as the 
competition among different jurisdictions promised by the cherished 
federalism “laboratory of ideas.”157  Nor is it surprising that tribes are 
entering these spaces as they seek greater control over their resources and 
self-governance.  Although the concept of cooperative tribal-federal 
agreements shows the plasticity of federalism, since tribes are exercising 
delegated statutory authority the approach only brings tribes into the 
 
152.  See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (2006) (providing for treatment as 
States); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7602(b)(5) (2006) (defining an air pollution control agency to 
include an agency of an Indian tribe).  Even prior to that, the 1975 Indian Self-Determination and 
Education Act enabled the transfer of the administration of several federal programs from the 
federal governmental to tribal governments, although several “militant” tribal governments 
rejected this model because it does not explicitly recognize tribal sovereignty and “perpetuates the 
hierarchical relationship with the federal government.”  Papillon, supra note 5, at 7.  According to 
Papillon, 212 of 336 federally recognized tribes have some form of an agreement or compact with 
the states involving some form of power sharing.  Id. at 9. 
153.  Biolsi comments that some “Indian thinkers” criticize what he calls “the Indian 
‘national geographic’ of federally recognized tribes” as constituting “ethnic fraud.” Biolsi, supra 
note 1, at 249.  
154.  Elizabeth Hutchinson, in her article on Joseph Brant, the eighteenth century leader of 
the Mohawk nation, commented on how some consider Brant’s view of himself as a subject and 
sovereign participant in the modern transatlantic world, relating to the King of England as an 
equal, manifested by his refusal to kiss the King’s ring and addressing him as “brother,” as a 
precedent for modern Indian tribes’ insistence on nation-to-nation diplomacy.  Hutchinson, supra 
note 60, at 213-14.  
155.  See Fletcher, supra note 59, at 67-69 (discussing federal-tribal, and state-tribal, and 
local-tribal agreements:  “[h]undreds, if not thousands, of these agreements exist and are in 
operation at the moment”). 
156.  Papillon, supra note 5, at 7.  Papillon notes that these intergovernmental coordination 
mechanisms have not eliminated conflicts between the three levels of government and discusses 
the conflicts and tensions that have plagued Indian gaming as an example, which were in part 
solved by the use of the compact model.  Id.  at 7-9. 
157.  Ryan, supra note 145, at 11-12.  
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bureaucracy of government in a way that is analogous to the plenary power 
doctrine—still subject to the dominant, preemptive power of Congress. 
Federalism also allows for the adaption of federal rules to local 
circumstances:  “Geographic uniformity is not an inevitable feature of a 
legal rule.  There may be many reasons for governing the same subject by 
different legal rules at different locations within the same legal system.”158  
The federal government frequently “tailors policies to local preferences” by 
enacting laws that cover only a specific geographic area, entering into 
cooperative arrangements with state agencies to implement federal policies, 
and sometimes even incorporating state law into federal law.159  Thus, it is 
common for “rulemakers” to adopt different localized rules reflecting 
varying physical conditions such as climate, terrain, or the “built 
environment” because they “perceive that localized differences in 
behavioral patterns necessitate divergent methods for accomplishing an 
underlying purpose.”160  The degree to which localism infiltrates federal 
policy also illustrates federalism’s elasticity. 
To the extent that tribes are similar to local governments, the 
expansiveness of federalism in this regard should help tribes. Both tribes 
and local governments provide “autonomous institutions that generate their 
own local rules,”161 and are each “intimately involved” in “where and how 
people live, public safety, work conditions, and education.”162  Both are 
powerless, subject to the plenary power of a higher sovereign, be it state163 
 
158.  Neuman, supra note 32, at 1201. 
159.  Id.  at 1202-03.  See also Id.  at 1202 (“Rather than enable local residents to realize 
their preferences from the bottom up by means of local institutions, legal systems sometimes 
attempt to accommodate perceived local preferences from the top down.”).  But Neuman warns 
that adapting federal law to local conditions, if carried too far, runs the risk of creating 
“geographical exceptions to policies otherwise regarded as fundamental”—what he calls 
“anomalous zones”—as these can become “sites of contestation over the polity’s fundamental 
values.”  Id.  at 1233. 
160.  Id.  at 1201 (explaining that “[t]he perception that objective physical or social 
conditions vary from place to place may lead rulemakers to pursue a consistent overall policy by 
adopting different localized legal rules.  Varying physical conditions, for example, often call for 
different rules. The physical differences may be natural—like climate or terrain—or they may 
involve the built environment.”). 
161.  Id.  at 1202 (“In the United States, federalism and local government provide 
autonomous institutions that generate their own local rules. States and cities have different scales, 
different constitutional status, and differing scopes of power, but each functions as a vehicle for 
local self-determination.”).  
162.  Davidson, supra note 147, at 968 (explaining that “local governments are the political 
institutions that most directly shape our public lives.”). 
163.  Id.  at 962 (explaining that “in the cooperative localism context, local governments act 
neither as subservient departments of state government nor as islands of independent authority.”). 
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or federal.164  Both suffer from an “uncertain constitutional status of local 
government, the structural incommensurability between governments at the 
local and national level, the triangulation and conflicts of interest that states 
interject into the federal-local relationship, and the potential of states as 
intermediate actors to react to any judicial protection of federal 
empowerment of local government.”165 Both “occupy a quasi-constitutional 
nether realm”—their constitutional role “remains fundamentally 
contested”166 putting them at a distinct disadvantage in dealing with both 
reigning jurisdictional authorities. “[I]n contemplating two, and only two, 
sovereigns, the reigning iconography of our federal scheme too often 
ignores local governments entirely in conceptualizing federalism or 
subsumes local governments into a general category of subnation polities 
controlled by the state.”167 Tribes, who have suffered the same federalism 
fate as local governments, also trigger “questions about the fracturing of 
sovereignty in our federal system.”168 
Yet tribes, like states, are fundamentally different than local 
governments because they are not dependent on the act of a higher 
sovereign for their creation like local governments are, and much of their 
land and many of their rights are based on treaties. Because both tribes and 
states existed as independent sovereigns prior to the formation of the United 
States, they are pre-constitutional and thus different from county and 
municipal governments, which are creations of state law.169 While looking 
 
164.  Id.  at 961 (“[T]he prevailing view of local government identity in federal law is one of 
fundamental powerlessness, with localities at the whim of the states’ plenary authority.  In a 
lesser-recognized tradition, however, courts have allowed local governments to involve federal 
authority to resist assertions of state power.  This judicial space for federal empowerment has 
granted local governments both a measure of autonomy to act in the absence of state authority and 
an ability to check state control.”). 
165.  Id.  at 976. 
166.  Id.  at 977. 
167.  Id.  at 965. 
168.  Id.  at 965 n.10. 
169.  Tebben, supra note 7, at 335 (“[W]hile States were sovereign entities predating the 
national government created by the Constitution, county governments, which were created by 
state law, were at no time sovereign.  Local governments receive constitutional recognition and 
status only indirectly through the constitutional recognition of the State.  The States have not been 
required by the national government to recognize or honor the sovereignty of local governments, 
as they have been required to recognize and honor the sovereignty of tribal nations.”) (quoting 
Reynolds v. Simms, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)).  Not discussed in this article is the option of treating 
tribes as though they were cities because this would not bring tribes into the Constitution and the 
political gains would be minimal, even though treating tribes like cities would not be a large 
conceptual leap given the similarities between them.  Like cities, tribes provide a range of local 
services to relatively small, geographically constrained population, probably use a representational 
form of government, and perhaps have “modest ‘taxing power and independent sources of 
revenue.’”  Abele & Prince, supra note 13, at 572.  On the positive side, the municipality 
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at the tribes’ quest for coequal sovereignty through the lens of localism 
provides a useful example of federalism’s malleability, it places tribes at 
level lower than states and still leaves them harnessed to the federal 
sovereign. 
Thus, jurisdictional boundaries between governments are neither rigid 
nor even necessarily terrestrial.170  The concept of federalism as it has 
evolved in this country does not necessitate a set number of sovereigns; 
indeed, the proliferation of subnational sovereigns at the local level belies 
that myth.  Nor does it dictate how those sovereigns must interact for all 
time.  But, while the concept of federalism may be pliable, it is not so to the 
point of dysfunction where its overall benefits could be lost. 
V. HOW THE CONSTITUTION MIGHT BE ADJUSTED TO 
INCLUDE A THIRD SOVEREIGN 
The next part of the article turns to possible adjustments to the 
Constitution’s bivalent federalism structure and tests those against various 
criteria to assure, among other things, that federalism’s benefits would not 
be lost if one or more of them is implemented.  One thing that makes the 
task of finding a federalism solution to the problem of diminished tribal 
sovereignty seemingly intractable171 is that the current constitutional 
distribution of power between the federal government and the states is the 
“product of complex negotiations between competing interests” long since 
arrived at by the bargaining parties.172  And that bargain excluded tribes.  
This decades old arrangement may be difficult to realign to include tribes 
absent a “significant external shock,”173 which seems unlikely given 
modern tribes lack of political and social power. 
 
approach can be tailored to the uniqueness of each tribe.  Abele and Prince, who analyzed the 
municipal model, found it had few Aboriginal supporters and no support among Aboriginal 
scholars in Canada.  Id. at 586 (noting, however, that some provincial governments support the 
idea, as do non-Aboriginal academics and commentators).  Canadian provinces, which are 
protective of their jurisdiction and also loath to relinquish territory to First Nations, also resisted 
the concept.  Id.  The municipal approach also decreases the role of the federal government as the 
principal protector of tribes and, at least theoretically, of the country’s treaty responsibilities 
towards tribes.  Id.  
170.  See Biolsi, supra note 1, at 240 (discussing the concept of political space as virtual 
space). 
171.  Papillon, supra note 5, at 4 (noting while “significant change has taken place in both 
Canada and the U.S. in the relationship between Indigenous peoples and the federal system,” that 
change has occurred “less in the formal structure of the federation than in patterns of governance 
and policy-making.”). 
172.  Id.  at 5. 
173.  Id.  (explaining that “[t]he balance between forces at the [center] and those in the 
constituent units is progressively institutionalized, creating interlocking vetoes that make 
alterations in the overall framework of the federation unlikely . . . .”).  It is also unlikely that tribes 
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The entrenched nature of the current power distribution between the 
federal government and states in the Constitution makes a path of pursuing 
incremental changes to the governance status of tribes appealing, especially 
where the cumulative effect of small alterations might lead over time to 
significant modifications in how tribes are treated.174  For example, David 
Super suggests groups on the outside, like tribes, might “achieve petit 
constitutional status for some of the norms important to them.”175  
However, the only norm of import to tribes in their effort to resist further 
loss of their sovereignty is co-equal authority with the federal government 
and the states, and that can only be achieved through large systemic 
changes in how power is currently distributed under the Constitution.176 
 
will be able to create an enduring and transformative constitutional moment comparable to those 
created by the civil rights or gender equality movement.  See Super, supra note 90, at 2807-08 
(discussing Bruce Ackerman’s “grand constitutionalism” and how constitutional moments can 
arise during “prolonged ‘down time’” and noting that governmental institutions can advance 
counter-majoritarian constitutional norms, such as civil liberties and civil rights, in the shadows of 
mainstream politics.). 
174.  Papillon, supra note 5, at 5.  Papillon talks about how incremental change can occur 
through “layering” the “superposition of new practices and norms over an institution, 
progressively leading to a disjuncture between formal rules and actual practices.”  Id.  He 
describes what he calls “effectively parallel regimes of governance,” which have occurred in the 
United States and resulted in changes in decision-making rules that reflect, “at least partly, the 
political status of Indigenous governments as representatives of distinctive and autonomous 
political communities,” while the super-structure, federation, remains unaltered.” Id. 
175.  Super talks about what he calls “petit constitutional moments,” which may be easier to 
achieve and be in fact more enduring, which he recommends for marginalized groups.  See Super, 
supra note 90, at 2812 (suggesting that “marginal groups unable to seize the public imagination 
[to generate a grand constitutional moment] . . . seek to achieve petit constitutional status for some 
of the norms important to them”). 
176.  Professor Skibine suggests that tribes are already included in the Constitution based on 
a theory that the Constitution adopted “preconstitutional powers necessarily inherent in any 
Federal Government”—powers that the Supreme Court has described “as ‘necessary concomitants 
of nationality.’”  Skibine, supra note 43, at 690 (quoting United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 181, 201 
(2004)).  Skibine does not:  
[B]elieve that the commerce power is sufficient to allow Congress to constitutionally 
incorporate tribes. While the treaty power may have served that purpose, the United 
States is no longer signing treaties with Indian nations, and contrary to the assertion of 
some, I do not believe that the treaties already signed accomplished such 
incorporation. A more interesting possibility is whether Congress can constitutionally 
incorporate the tribes pursuant to what Professors Cleveland and Frickey have termed 
the ‘inherent powers.’ These are powers which Justice Breyer acknowledged in his 
Lara majority opinion when he remarked that Congress’s legislative authority in 
Indian affairs may rest ‘not upon ‘affirmative grants of the Constitution,’ but upon the 
Constitution’s adoption of preconstitutional powers necessarily inherent in any Federal 
Government, namely powers that this Court has described as ‘necessary concomitants 
of nationality. 
Id. (interal citations omitted).  See also id.  at 690-91 (propounding a theory of “quasi 
constitutional incorporation” through the Indian Commerce Clause and the 1787 Northwest 
Ordinance, noting that the latter holds out the promise of contemplating “an eventual greater 
incorporation of tribes within the political system of the United States.”). 
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It is also imperative that any change made in the distribution of power 
between tribes, the federal government, and the states happens at the 
constitutional level.177  Only constitutional status will give the change 
permanence and vest it with a sufficiently “exalted status.”178  While 
obligations and their attendant norms need not be exclusively confined to 
the Constitution, they gather strength when they are situated in it179 and 
help persuade others of the obligation’s supremacy and entrenched status.180  
Characterizing something as constitutional also increases the likelihood that 
it will prevail in conflicts with lesser order obligations and that “it cannot be 
changed by ordinary legislation.”181 
However, constitutionalizing any change to the current sovereignty 
distribution in the Constitution makes it more difficult for tribes to opt out 
of any ineffective or even harmful fix to their present situation.182  Bringing 
tribes into the Constitution as co-equal sovereigns might result in 
constitutional norms, like those found in the Bill of Rights,183 being applied 
 
177.  Richard Primus, Unbundling Constitutionality, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1079, 1081 (2013) 
(explaining that constitutional rules can relate to the structure of governmental institutions, protect 
a fundamental value or norm, or enjoy “sacred status in American society.”). 
178.  Id.  at 1151.  Primus warns, however, that the label constitutional does not determine 
whether the rule is textual, supreme or entrenched, let alone enforceable through judicial review 
and may do no more than imply those results.  Id.  See also Skibine, supra note 33, at 4 (“Without 
such constitutional incorporation, the tribes exist at the ‘whim of the sovereign,’ be it the United 
States Congress or now the Supreme Court.”). 
179.  See Super, supra note 90, at 2832 (discussing constitutionalizing the “duty” or norm of 
preventing severe hardship and how greater progress was made in engaging the leadership of both 
political parties “to appeal to the principle of preventing severe harm” than engaging in partisan 
politics).  But see Primus, supra note 177, at 1127 (contending that the written text of the 
Constitution is not the sole source of “constitutional authority,” which can also be found in the 
“rules and norms and institutions that guide the process of government . . . .”).  However, one 
source of these rules, “ethos,” may be problematic for tribes to the extent it rests on heroic 
“narratives of American history,” which cast Indians as villains not heroes. Id. at 1134.  
180.  Primus, supra note 177, at 1150 (establishing that an obligation, a principle, or a norm 
“has constitutional status” is equivalent “to persuading one’s audience” that it is “supreme, 
entrenched, and enforceable through judicial review”).  Primus describes this to be “a matter of 
habits of thought.”  Id.  
181.  Id.  at 1081. 
182.  Krakoff, supra note 11, at 1198 (“What is essential, however, is the idea that tribes can 
opt in or out of any proposed legislative fix.  This comports with the notion of experiential 
sovereignty, which will be different for each tribe.  Indian nations know best themselves how 
much tinkering with legal sovereignty their cultures can withstand.  Unlike categorical rules 
issuing from the Supreme Court, congressional solutions, whether in the form of legislation or 
negotiated compacts, can be tailored to allow for individual tribal assessment of the gains and 
losses implicit in any legal fix.”). 
183.  Skibine, supra note 33, at 45.  An example of this was enactment of the Indian Civil 
Rights Act, which applied some parts of the Bill of Rights to tribal courts.  Fletcher, supra note 
59, at 99. 
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to them because they will have lost the ability to resist their imposition 
based on their cultural uniqueness as tribes.184 
Despite the putative costs to tribes of constitutionalizing any change to 
the power distribution between states, the federal government, and them, 
this article posits that the only way to enhance tribal sovereignty is to bring 
tribes into the Constitution as coequal sovereigns.  This can be done either 
through the exercise of some existing constitutional authority, like the 
Treaty Clause or through the amendment process,185 for example, to allow 
the creation of new tribal states within existing states.186 
In addition to requiring that any change to the current status of tribal 
sovereignty have a constitutional imprimatur, this article also stipulates that 
the proposed change must:  (1) not weaken the existing federal structure or 
create an external national security problem, (2) empower tribes to manage 
their futures more effectively, (3) provide sufficient flexibility to 
incorporate as many of the different types of tribes without creating 
disabling and destabilizing disparities among them,187 and (4) have political 
salience.  The article now turns to a discussion of how existing 
constitutional authority might be used to enhance tribal sovereignty 
followed by a discussion of how the Constitution might be amended to 
achieve the same result. 
A. USING EXISTING CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY 
Changes in constitutional meaning can occur through interpreting 
constitutional text.188  For example, Jack Balkin’s theory of “Framework 
 
184.  Price, supra note 23, at 713 (referring to the tribes’ “uniquely compelling claims to 
maintaining cultural and political norms that depart from federal constitutional requirements”). 
185.  Primus, supra note 177, at 1081 (Constitutional rules can relate to the structure of 
governmental institutions, protect a fundamental value or norm, or enjoy “sacred status in 
American society.”).  See also Hannum, supra note 132, at 495 (suggesting possibility of 
constitutional amendment to assure tribal authority/responsibilities). 
186.  See generally Mila Versteeg & Emily Zachin, American Constitutional Exceptionalism 
Revisited, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (discussing the tradition of amending state 
constitutions and the constitutions of other countries).  The authors discuss the conflict between 
Thomas Jefferson who “famously argued that the earth belongs in usufruct to the living, and, 
therefore, that each generation should write its own constitution” and James Madison who argued 
that constitutions should bind future generations as well as the current one.  Id. at 20 (internal 
quotations omitted). 
187.  The presence of urban or landless Indians makes it particularly difficult to find a  
land-based solution that will nonetheless incorporate them. 
188.  See, e.g., Versteeg & Zachin, supra note 186, at 26 n.145 (quoting Woodrow Wilson’s 
comment characterizing the Supreme Court as “a constitutional convention in continuous 
session.”).  See also Primus, supra note 177, at 1084 (discussing small-c constitutionalism, the 
main attribute of which is the decoupling of constitutional status from textuality).  See also id. at 
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Originalism” sees “the Constitution as an initial framework for governance 
that sets politics in motion,” which must “be filled out over time through 
constitutional construction.”189  The very title of the article portends of a 
more expansionist view of textual interpretation. Richard Primus writes:  “a 
large part of the process of constitutional change is about shifting 
expectations that make it plausible to read a text differently at different 
times.”190  According to Primus, a dominant practice can shape people’s 
“constitutional expectations,” which can turn people’s attention away from 
the precise words in the Constitution’s text.191  Indeed, one could argue, as 
Primus does, that we have the “capacity to read the Constitution to mean 
the sort of things we believe it would make sense for it to mean—to accord, 
that is, with our constitutional expectations.”192  Primus describes the 
struggle by constitutional law scholars “to close the gap between the text 
and the set of rules that are recognized as entitled to supremacy, 
entrenchment, and judicial review” as a “normal dynamic of American 
constitutional interpretation.”193 
If Balkin and Primus are right that text is only a starting point, then one 
way to constitutionalize non-textual norms is to read the text broadly 
enough to encompass them.194  Indeed, according to Mila Versteeg and 
Emily Zachin, the “spare and rigid framework” of the Constitution together 
with extant norms of judicial supremacy combine to give the courts 
 
1090 (discussing a vision of constitutionality that has one basis, text, and “three consistent payoffs 
(supremacy, [supermajoritarian] entrenchment, judicial reviewability) . . . .”). 
189.  Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. 
REV. 549, 550 (2009).  According to Skibine, Balkin juxtaposed his theory of framework 
originalism with what he called “skyscraper orginalism,” under which the Constitution is almost a 
finished product, which can be built through the amendment process.  Skibine, supra note 33, at 
44 n.313.  
190.  Primus, supra note 177, at 1098 n.45. 
191.  Id.  at 1107. 
192.  Id.  at 1111.   
193.  Id.  at 1106. 
194.  Id.  at 1098.  Primus also notes that once a rule or principle’s constitutional status is 
established, even though not based in text, it “may move along the continuum of textuality” and 
become associated with a particular constitutional clause through the operation of official stories 
and once so associated may so “color our intuitions about the text that we come to think of the 
rules as fairly implied by the text rather than merely associated with it.”  Id. at 1153.  But see 
Skibine, supra note 33, at 45 (commenting that it is one thing for the court to use its interpretative 
powers to stretch the Constitution and to make most of the Bill of Rights applicable to the states, 
but quite another to do that for tribes without help of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
clause). 
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“remarkable room to make constitutional meaning.”195  Some ways that 
might be done to enhance tribal sovereignty are set forth below.196 
1. Treating Tribes as Though They Were Inhabitants of a 
 Federal Enclave Like the District of Columbia 
The Enclave Clause of the Constitution197 authorizes Congress to 
acquire land from the states by either cession or purchase for the 
construction of forts, arsenals, dockyards, other “needful buildings,” and for 
“the Seat of the government of the United States.”198  State laws are 
generally preempted in federal enclaves unless enacted before the creation 
of the enclave,199 the cession expressly reserved the right of the state to 
legislate some particular matter,200 or Congress clearly and unambiguously 
authorized state regulation within the enclave.201 
One possibility, therefore, is to interpret the Enclave Clause202 
expansively to include tribal reservations.  This is not as farfetched as it 
might sound because federally recognized Indian reservations are former 
federal territorial lands reserved for tribes in exchange for tribes ceding 
their lands to the federal government.203  Treating Indian reservations as 
 
195.  Versteeg & Zachin, supra note 186, at 44. 
196.  This discussion does not include an expansive reading of the two sections of the 
Constitution that actually mention Indians.  For an analysis of these two provisions, particularly 
the Indian Commerce Clause, see Robertson, supra note 6, at 388-90. 
197.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (providing that Congress shall have power “to exercise 
exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever over such District[s] . . . as may, by Cession of 
particular States . . . become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like 
Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the 
Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful 
Buildings.”). 
198.  Erin Ryan cites the creation of federal enclaves as an example of negotiated federalism 
where the states trade power with the federal government ceding power in exchange for the 
application of desired federal policies, like the creation of a national park or the application of 
some federal law that is viewed as beneficial to the state.  Ryan, supra note 145, at 37 n.166 
(“States also trade power with the federal government in the negotiation of federal enclaves 
carved out of existing state lands, in which states often cede power in exchange for desired federal 
policies—such as the creation of a wanted National Park, or the application of the Assimilative 
Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2006), which allows the borrowing of state law when there is no 
applicable federal statute.”). 
199.  Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 264 (1963). 
200.  Sundaram v. Brookhaven Nat’l Lab., 424 F. Supp. 2d 545, 569 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).  
201.  Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 174 (1988). 
202.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. 
203.  Frickey, supra note 11, at 439 (“[A] treaty usually involved a tribal cession of 
preexisting rights (especially to land and related rights such as water, fishing, hunting, and 
gathering) and a reservation of all that had not been ceded away (again, especially land—hence 
the term “Indian reservation”). Treaties, therefore, did not ordinarily involve tribal surrender of all 
rights in return for federal largesse.”). 
         
56 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:13 
 
federal lands within the purview of the Enclave Clause grants those lands 
constitutional status.  However, judging by the District of Columbia, their 
inhabitants gain little more than self-rule, which tribes already have, and a 
non-voting House member who can serve and vote on committees.204  
Being an enclave still leaves tribes subject to the “plenary power” of 
Congress.205  Yet, the potential remains for additional powers to be granted 
to tribes and to their congressional representatives under the Enclave 
Clause—the same way Home Rule powers of the District government have 
expanded.206  It is also possible that treating reservations like federal 
enclaves might dissuade the Supreme Court from allowing state law to 
diminish tribal authority on reservation lands because state law is so clearly 
preempted within a federal enclave. 
Thus, granting individual tribal reservations federal enclave status 
alone gains them little more than constitutional stature.  Even then, the 
content of that status is derived from the federal sovereign.207  While the 
District of Columbia example provides a basis to argue for at least  
non-voting members in Congress, achieving that would require an act of 
Congress, which could easily be rescinded.208  On the other hand, the use of 
the Enclave Clause to grow the tribes’ share of the governing pie would not 
destabilize the existing distribution of power because tribal representatives 
from those enclaves would have no real legislative power.  Nor would the 
approach strain the constitutional text too badly.  Tribal enclaves could 
reflect tribal differences by establishing separate enclaves for each 
reservation—although flooding Congress with additional non-voting 
 
204.  This option is discussed in discussion supra Part V.A. 
205.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.  
206.  District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act, Pub L. 
No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774 (1973). 
207.  James Irving, Self-Determination & Colonial Enclaves: The Success of Singapore and 
the Failure of Theory, 12 SINGAPORE YEAR BOOK OF INT’L L. AND CONTRIBUTORS 97, 101 
(2008) (describing what author calls the “creation of an exception category of ‘colonial enclaves’ 
to which special rules apply” listing Hong Kong and Goa among others as examples, and saying, 
in addition, that these examples “represent outcomes wholly unsupportable according to the 
colonial rules of self-determination. The populations in question were incorporated into a third 
state without a vote and either with the active support of the international community or at least 
with its complicity.”)  See also id.  at 102 (allowing colonial enclaves to continue to exist 
perpetuates colonialism; they should be returned to the claimant state since the people and land 
continue to belong to it, and they are too small to “constitute viable states.”). 
208.  See District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act, Pub 
L. No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774, § 601 (1973) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the 
Congress of the United States reserves the right, at any time, to exercise its constitutional authority 
as legislature for the District, by enacting legislation for the District on any subject, whether 
within or without the scope of legislative power granted to the Council by this Act, including 
legislation to amend or repeal any law in force in the District prior to or after enactment of this 
Act and any act passed by the Council.”). 
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members might create implementation problems.  Because the proposal 
does not take away existing political power from states or increase tribal 
political power, it might have some political salience with non-Indians. 
2. Use of the Territories Clause to Grant Tribes Equivalent 
 Status to Other American Territories 
Another possibility is for Congress to use the territories clause209 to 
convert tribal reservations into territories.210  This approach does not require 
a huge conceptual leap; both tribes and territories share the same status as 
‘“foreign to the United States in a domestic sense,’ though not subject to 
foreign sovereignty . . . .”211  In both cases, neither the citizens of American 
territories nor tribal members consented to the imposition of American 
sovereignty, nor does it appear likely that the federal government will 
relinquish its sovereignty over the lands of either.212  Although tribes and 
the territories “should enjoy the same autonomy in enforcing their own laws 
that states do in enforcing theirs,”213 they suffer from the current Supreme 
Court’s “skepticism about constitutional exceptionalism,”214 which creates 
“grave legal uncertainties” for both.215 
The parallels between territories and land-based tribes could make this 
a relatively easy transition for tribes to make.  No change in the status of the 
Union or constitutional text would be required to reach this result, and there 
should be little political opposition because the tribes gain no real 
legislative power. 
 
209.  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make 
all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the 
United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of 
the United States, or of any particular State.”).  There are five major “insular” areas under U.S. 
sovereignty:  Puerto Rico, Guam, U.S. Virgin Islands, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth 
of the Northern Mariana Islands. Price, supra note 23, at 681. 
210.  For a detailed discussion of what it means to be an unincorporated territory and the 23 
Insular Cases, see Skibine, supra note 43, at 690. 
211.  Price, supra note 23, at 683 (quoting Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 341-42 (1901) 
(White, J., concurring)). 
212.  Id.  at 713.  See also Fletcher, supra note 59, at 48 (“Tribal consent to federal statutes, 
regulations, and cases that decide matters critical to American Indian People and tribes long has 
been lacking”; and propounding a new theory of tribal consent as a way to protect tribal 
sovereignty from state and federal intrusion). 
213.  Price, supra note 23, at 665. 
214.  Id.  at 691. 
215.  Id. 
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But territories, unlike tribes, have no judicially protected inherent 
sovereignty,216 which makes all governmental authority in the territories 
“federal in character,”217 not unlike lands covered by Enclave Clause. 
Territories “were incorporated as part of the federal government and not 
under a third sphere of sovereignty” like the tribes.218  This means any 
power that tribes would have under the Territories Clause would be 
derivative from the federal government, principally from Congress219—a 
lower status than they now have. 
Additionally, the approach does not change the dual sovereignty 
structure of the Constitution.  A separate step would have to be taken to 
withdraw federal sovereignty over the tribes—a step Congress would be 
unlikely to take—and, without more, would leave tribes vulnerable to the 
continued incursion of state sovereignty over them and their lands.  The 
solution leaves unresolved the problem of urban Indians and does not 
address the vast differences among tribes, which could result in the creation 
of 325 separate territories of varying size or the aggregation of very 
different tribes into a few territories—perhaps even a single territory. 
 While territorial status might gain for the tribes one or more non-
voting members in the House of Representatives, comparable to the District 
of Columbia under the Enclave Clause,220 they would gain little else.  In 
fact, their independent sovereign status would be reduced. 
3. Using the Compact Clause to Negotiate a Power-Sharing 
 Arrangement with the Federal Government,  
 the States, and Tribes 
For over a quarter of a century, the federal government has entered into 
cooperative agreements with qualified states pursuant to various 
environmental laws under which the federal government delegates to those 
 
216.  Id.  at 664 (“First, it treats tribes and territories quite differently despite the practical 
similarities between them:  While case law recognizes retained inherent sovereignty for tribes, 
territorial governments exercise only delegated federal power.”). 
217.  Id.  at 680.   
218.  Skibine, supra note 33, at 43. 
219.  Price, supra note 23, at 682. 
220.  Id.  at 661 n.17 (citing 48 U.S.C. §§ 891–894 (2014)).  Congressional delegates from 
the territories and the District of Columbia can sit on committees and even vote in committees, 
receive the same salary and allowances that that any other member of Congress receives, and 
except for not being able to vote on the floor “do[] what any member of Congress can do.  Glenn 
Starbird et al., A Brief History of Indian Legislative Representatives, MAINE STATE LAW AND 
LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE LIBRARY (Dec. 9, 2013), www maine.gov/legis/lawlib/indianreps htm.  
See also 48 U.S.C. §§ 1711-1735 (2014) (governing delegates from Guam, American Samoa, and 
Virgin Islands). 
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states primacy in the administration of certain programs.  Erin Ryan calls 
these agreements “capacity-based federalism bargains” because they 
reallocate federal authority to some other sovereign, usually the states.221  
They are basically “bargained for encroachment” by states in which the 
states “negotiate for federal approval” of agreements that “derogate federal 
power” and give the states permission to “encroach on federal 
jurisdiction.”222  Ryan cites, as examples of these cooperative agreements, 
state compacts with Congress in which states agree to be constrained by 
federal law and Congress agrees to create “forums for long-term, iterative 
sharing of policymaking authority with states.”223  The experience for tribes 
under these agreements is mixed and in many cases has resulted in greater 
state intrusion into tribal affairs.224 
While this approach could move tribes towards greater parity with 
states in their dealings with the federal government and could be a source of 
financial and technical assistance for tribes to begin administering programs 
that had been run by the federal government, it does not change the basic 
structural inequality of the three sovereigns in other areas of governance not 
covered by the compact.  Nor does it offer any promise of enhanced tribal 
participation in that structure, and it leaves the tribes dependent on federal 
largess with respect to the permanence and contours of any delegated 
authority and the resources to exercise that authority.  Further, since the 
source of tribal authority in these bargained for arrangements is statutory 
and constrained by the scope of the power devolved upon them, the 
sovereignty tribes exercise under this approach is anything but equal.  
Indeed, preserving “the primacy of the federal government to set national 
priorities and prescribe standards through which to advance those 
 
221.  Ryan finds these “especially useful in advancing interjurisdictional synergy.”  Ryan, 
supra note 145, at 125.  Ryan provides a thorough discussion of the topic of negotiating 
federalism, its perils and benefits, what makes for a successful/unsuccessful bargaining experience 
and bargained for result, and how negotiation is and could be used to solve some federalism 
problems.  See generally id. 
222.  Id.  at 40 (saying in addition “[a]s a doctrinal matter, congressional approval is required 
whenever such an agreement would increase the power of states at the expense of the federal 
government, effectively reallocating the initial distribution of regulatory authority.”).  
“Congressional consent to these compacts also saves interstate compacts that might otherwise 
encroach on Congress’s exclusive authority over interstate commerce.”  Id.  at 41. 
223.  Id. 
224.  Papillon, supra note 5, at 8.  Indeed, opponents of these compacts and the triggering 
devolution of federal programmatic administrative authority view the approach as “forced 
federalism on Indian nations.”  Id.  at 10.  On the other hand, programmatic transfers accompanied 
by federal funds can enhance the capacity and resources of tribes to administer their own 
programs, define their priorities, and perhaps even expand the future scope of their activities.  Id.  
at 7. 
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priorities,” while also capturing the benefits of pluralism, is a critical 
feature of these cooperative regimes.225  However, preserving federal 
primacy is inconsistent with the achievement of co-equal sovereignty for 
tribes. 
But, the Compact Clause226 offers the potential to go several steps 
beyond federal-tribal cooperative arrangements to administer delegated 
federal programs or tribal-state compacts negotiated during the 1990s.227 
Horst Hannum suggests the crafting of a “new compact or agreement” 
between tribes and the federal government “to articulate the minimum 
content” of authority reserved or delegated to the tribes.228 These new 
compacts would be “[g]rounded in the inherent sovereignty of Indian tribes 
and the United States Constitution, and given substance by the political 
environment . . . .”229 Since there are no minimal powers inherent in the 
concept of sovereignty other than “the ability to define one’s own 
membership and the nature of governmental institutions,”230 its content 
must be negotiated.  Thus, the use of the Compact Clause to negotiate for 
tribes a share of the Constitution’s divided sovereignty might be possible. 
The content of any such negotiated compact or agreement could allow 
tribes to assume more power and authority in the federal system than they 
have at present and could also allow for variations among tribes, as each 
 
225.  Davidson, supra note 147, at 967.  See also id.  at 979 (discussing cooperative localism, 
and saying “the central jurisprudential question of cooperative localism becomes the source and 
breadth of local authority in that relationship.”). 
226.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay 
any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or 
Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, 
or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.”). 
227.  See Fletcher, supra note 46, at 181 (“The political relationship between the United 
States and Indian tribes remains as powerful as ever, but a new and more dynamic relationship 
between states and Indian tribes is growing.  States and Indian tribes are beginning to smooth over 
the rough edges of federal Indian law—jurisdictional confusion, historical animosity between 
states and Indian tribes, competition between sovereigns for tax revenue, economic development 
opportunities, and regulatory authority—through cooperative agreements.  In effect, a new 
political relationship is springing up all over the nation between states, local units of government, 
and Indian tribes.”).  Carol Tebben also talks about “day-to-day interaction” between tribes and 
states at the local level and the establishment of federal/state/tribal judicial councils where judges 
representing the three sovereigns can discuss jurisdictional issues arising in their cases.  Tebben, 
supra note 7, at 351 (“This day-to-day interaction between the tribe and the State at the local level 
includes, for example, the cross-deputizing of officers as representatives of both the tribe and the 
State, local state court extension of full faith and credit to tribal court decisions, local county 
sheriff enforcement of tribal court decisions, and tribal court extension of full faith and credit to 
state court decisions.”).  
228.  Hannum, supra note 132, at 495. 
229.  Maon, supra note 90, at 130. 
230.  Hannum, supra note 132, at 494-95. 
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tribe could negotiate its own compact with the federal government.231 The 
proposal would also not threaten the structural integrity of the Union. 
Skibine takes Hannum’s concept of a compact one step further.  He 
proposes, as a way of including Indian tribes in “Our Federalism,”232 a 
“compact of incorporation” similar to the legislation granting Puerto Rico 
commonwealth status.233  Skibine’s compact would set out “a baseline of 
tribal sovereignty,” which would delineate the relationships among the 
tribes, the federal government, and the several states: a relationship that 
could only be changed through renegotiation by the parties.234  He believes 
that such a compact would “more permanently” secure the place of tribes 
“as sovereign entities within Our Federalism.”235 
A negotiated power-sharing agreement like that proposed by Hannum 
and Skibine reflects the late Phillip Frickey’s rejoinder that “[a] proper 
commitment to constitutionalism in federal Indian law would not bring the 
Constitution to Indian country by judicial fiat, but instead would encourage 
a process by which tribes would be integrated into the constitutional 
framework through negotiation and consent.”236  In other words, “the 
central constitutional idea” here is that “relations between tribes and the 
American government should be governed largely by negotiation.”237  The 
possible use of compacts reflects the evolution of tribal governance “from a 
highly centralized hierarchical and fairly homogenous system essentially 
concentrated in federal hands” into what is now “a far more complex 
multilevel structure of governance” in which tribes could play an 
increasingly important part in the implementation of federal policies and 
programs.238 
Negotiating separate sovereignty agreements with tribes who want to 
enter into a different relationship with federal and state governments would 
 
231.  Id.  at 495. 
232.  Skibine, supra note 43, at 694 (explaining that “Indian tribes are not yet considered 
fully included in Our Federalism,” and proposing “that Congress enact a compact of 
incorporation, the process of which would be similar to the Commonwealth legislation enacted for 
Puerto Rico.”). 
233.  Id.  
234.  Id.  at 692.  Skibine notes, in addition, that his concept would mean Congress “would 
lose its plenary power over Indian tribes.”  Id.  He finds some urgency in the creation of a compact 
or “a covenant” with the United States because playing the “game” under the rules set by the 
Supreme Court “will slowly but surely result in the total subordination of Indian tribes to the 
interests of the various states where their respective reservations are located.”  Id.  at 694-95. 
235.  Id.  at 695. 
236.  Frickey, supra note 11, at 470 n.217. 
237.  Id.  at 482. 
238.  Papillon, supra note 5, at 13. 
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not strain constitutional text or the federal structure of government.239  
Depending on the bargaining powers and goals of tribal negotiators, 
federal-tribal sovereignty compacts could enhance the status of individual 
tribes in the federal system.240  Because non-Indians could be part of the 
negotiation, a negotiated sovereignty compact increases the likelihood that 
the result will accommodate different interests and rights and, therefore, be 
acceptable to non-Indians.241  Sovereignty compacts could also be tailored 
to reflect the different needs and aspirations of individual tribes and offer an 
exit option for tribes who can simply rescind the compact and return 
whatever delegated authority they received under it to the federal 
government.242 
On the other hand, whatever authority tribes exercise under such 
compacts would be constrained by principles of federal sovereignty and 
preemption.243  Compacts do not alter the constitutional foundations of 
American federalism or change its structure to admit Indian tribes; Papillon, 
when discussing the Canadian version of this model, calls compacts an 
“institutional adaption of the federal regime.”244  While the limitations of 
this approach may increase its political salience overall, the individual 
negotiated sovereignty agreement’s replacement of state authority with 
tribal authority would likely create opposition.  Compacts also offer little 
 
239.  See Saikrishna Prakash, Against Tribal Fungibility, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1069, 1108 
(2004) (concluding “federal government lacks a plenary, nationwide ‘Indian power,’” and arguing 
each tribe’s relationship with federal government should be considered individually). 
240.  On the theory that tribes enter into these negotiations with some “normative leverage” 
or “morally based power” based on their historic mistreatment at the hand of both federal and state 
governments, they might have a slight bargaining edge, which could increase if they share 
“authoritative norms” such as “fairness” and other norms that apply more specifically to the 
situation in which negotiation is occurring.  Ryan, supra note 145, at 79 (“Finally, normative 
leverage is morally based power, compelling the parties in a certain direction based on shared 
authoritative norms, such as fairness, consistency, patriotism, honesty, and any other values that 
might apply more locally.”). 
241.  Hannum, supra note 132, at 495 (“[S]overeignty per se is not the solution, although 
sovereignty remains a valuable concept that Native Americans may use to argue for retaining 
residual and treaty rights.  But both parties also need to recognize—in any relationship short of 
complete tribal independence—that defining the extent of respective governmental powers, 
requires mutual consent and the accommodation of often conflicting rights and interest.”).  
Hannum notes the “willingness” among states “to formulate new arrangements of autonomy, 
minority rights, delegated powers etc., that seek to arrive at realistic modes of power-sharing 
rather than to insist on formal delineations of sovereignty.”  Id. 
242.  Erin Ryan cites the exit option as an element of genuine consent.  Ryan, supra note 
145, at 13 (For a compact to have “procedural legitimacy,” there must be genuine consent to the 
ultimate agreement by the parties.  This can arise “when parties sufficiently understand their 
interests, can meaningfully opt out of the agreement, and are faithfully represented at the 
negotiating table.”). 
243.  Papillon, supra note 5, at 13 (discussing the use of compacts in Canada). 
244.  Id. 
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permanence, as Congress can renegotiate or modify them.  Additionally, 
there is the very real prospect of vast differences in the contents of each 
sovereignty compact, depending on the bargaining acumen of the tribal 
negotiators, enabling differences and inequalities between tribes to emerge 
and become a source of discord among tribes. 
4. Reactivate the Treaty Clause and Apply it to Tribes as Though 
 They Were Foreign Nations 
Frickey recommended the resumption of treaty-making245 with Indian 
tribes.246  He said doing that, whether under the authority of Article II of the 
Constitution or by agreements “ratified through bicameralism and 
presentment, would be a major step toward greater normative doctrinal and 
practical legitimacy” and would have more than “symbolic” value.247  Julie 
Clement sees an added value of extending the simple label of “foreign” to 
Indian tribes and categorizing them with other independent nations.248  This 
change would offset the poor historical record that the tribes have working 
with Congress.249  It would also provide a basis for eradicating the label of 
“dependent nation,” as it would be “a contradiction in terms to exercise 
plenary power over a sovereign.”250 
To Clement, a “step toward ‘foreign’ [is] a step away from 
‘dependent’” and toward the goals of self-sufficiency and independence.251  
Francies Abele and Michael Prince call the approach advocated by Frickey 
and Clement “treaty federalism” and declare that relying on diplomatic 
communication “gives formal recognition to the mutual rights, autonomies, 
 
245.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and 
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present 
concur . . . .”). 
246.  A variation on this approach not discussed in this article, other than being briefly 
mentioned here, is Vine Deloria’s proposal that tribes should “seek the status of an international 
protectorate under the tutelage of the United States.”  See VINE DELORIA, JR., BEHIND THE TRIAL 
OF BROKEN TREATIES:  AN INDIAN DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, 252-55 (1974).  In some 
ways tribes already are de facto international protectorates because of their small, weak status.  
See Hannum, supra note 132, at 492 (mentioning that Jackson “has suggested that small, weak 
states have become de facto international protectorates or ‘quasi state,’ i.e., no longer fair game 
for conquest (as would have been the case under traditional international law) but not really 
capable of exercising truly sovereign powers on their own.”) (citing ROBERT H. JACKSON, QUASI-
STATES SOVEREIGNTY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AND THE THIRD WORLD (1990)).  
247.  Frickey, supra note 11, at 489. 
248.  Clement, supra note 11, at 681.  
249.  Id. 
250.  Id.  at 679. 
251.  Id.  
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and obligations of sovereign communities.”252  While, concededly, treaties 
cannot give one foreign state a share in the governance of another state, 
they might enhance tribal immunity from federal and state intrusion into the 
management of tribal affairs and provide tribes with a larger share of the 
social and economic pie. 
Reactivating the treaty power with respect to federal-tribal relations is 
not quite as strange as it may sound, even though the federal government 
has not entered into treaties with Indian tribes since 1871.253  Tribes never 
“voluntarily” relinquished their status as sovereign nations entitled to be 
engaged with through the treaty mechanism.  They have never been 
“subordinates” of the United States, which is why they relied on treaties to 
determine their land base and assure their protection.254  “Before any 
Europeans came to this country, Indian tribes were certainly foreign 
nations—foreign to all other nations and to each other.”255  Clement argues 
that that situation has not changed, saying “[t]here is no evidence that 
Indian tribes’ foreign status has been withdrawn by treaty or statute, and 
there is at least an argument that a nation does not cease being foreign based 
solely on dependency.”256 
Abele and Prince, however, question the application of “treaty 
federalism” in Canada, under which aboriginal governments and the 
Canadian Crown would be part of a “treaty-based alliance,”257 because the 
concept does not require that aboriginal governments actually join the 
Canadian confederation.  Instead, sovereign aboriginal governments would 
enter into separate relationships with the confederation, the terms of each 
one of which would be defined in a treaty.258  They conclude that treaty 
 
252.  Abele & Prince, supra note 13, at 582 (discussing the concept in the Canadian context).  
See also id.  at 582 (“The Aboriginal idea of “treaty federalism” is not at all alien to the European 
tradition from which Canadian federalism emerged. Translated into the jargon of modern political 
science, a “treaty” relationship essentially means that the political, social and economic relations 
among sovereign nations are based on diplomatic agreements between the governments of these 
nations, and not on majority decisions based on the demographic weight that each nation 
possesses. There is no central government but only negotiated and contractual agreement among 
governments.”) (quoting Thomas O. Hueglin, 1993, Exploring Concepts of Treaty Federalism:  A 
Comparative Perspective, INSTITUTE OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS 37 (1993)). 
 
253.  25 U.S.C. § 71 (2006) (providing that “no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of 
the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power 
with whom the United States may contract by treaty . . . .”). 
254.  Clement, supra note 11, at 665. 
255.  Id.  
256.  Id.  at 666.  
257.  Abele & Prince, supra note 13, at 571. 
258.  Id.  at 579.   
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federalism is unlikely to succeed as a way of enhancing the sovereignty of 
Canada’s aboriginal peoples because it “appears to challenge the basic 
sovereignty of the Canadian state,”259 making the approach probably 
unacceptable to the Canadian people.  The public reaction in the United 
States might well be the same.260 
Treaty federalism also potentially fractures the Union by riddling it 
with separate nations who could enter into treaties with foreign nations.  
This approach, more than any other discussed in the article, threatens the 
national security of the United States unless additional steps were taken to 
restrict the tribes’ treaty-making authority to the United States. 
Further, negotiating a treaty in many ways is no different than 
negotiating a federal-tribal sovereignty compact, where the success with 
which tribes engage in the process will depend on the same considerations 
that make the compact a success for the negotiating parties.  Treaties are, 
after all, the end product of a negotiation in which parties compromise their 
goals.  Therefore, there is no assurance that new treaties will end up 
benefitting all tribes equally, let alone tribes en masse.  Even if they do, 
they will still require Senate ratification, which would be far from assured. 
Additionally, since treaties cannot contravene the Constitution, it is 
unclear how a treaty could create co-equal sovereignty for tribes, let alone 
change the current constitutional sovereignty balance.  Relying on treaty 
federalism as a means of enhancing tribal sovereignty also emphasizes 
differences between Indians and non-Indians, which could weaken a sense 
of “mutual responsibility and sharing connected with a common 
citizenship.”261  This might reduce the political salience of the approach. 
Like any agreement, including those developed under the Compact 
Clause discussed previously, a treaty could require the development of new 
political and administrative institutions within tribes.  While treaty 
federalism might prompt the creation of shared institutions to reflect the 
actual interdependence of tribes and the federal government and “shared 
 
259.  Id.  at 587.  See also id.  at 588 (“treaty federalism will most likely not become the 
main pathway to self-determination for Aboriginal peoples.”). 
260.  One difference between the two countries is that the insistence of Canadian aboriginal 
peoples on the right of self-government stems from a uniquely Canadian source, the 1763 Royal 
Proclamation, which recognized two distinct political communities “coexisting in a territory and 
relating to each other with mutual respect.”  Id.  at 580.  Another basis for this insistence, 
according to Abele and Prince, is that the “Aboriginal-Canadian relationship was never 
transformed from a confederal one among sovereign nations to a federal one under centralized 
constitutional authority with residual powers’ held by the Canadian government.”  Id. (quoting 
Hueglin, supra 252, at 9). 
261.  Abele & Prince, supra note 13, at 582 (discussing the concept in the context of the 
Canadian federation and aboriginal demands for greater self-determination). 
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jurisdiction over resources and the practical benefits of cooperative 
arrangements,”262 these arrangements would require negotiation and run the 
risk of unsatisfactory resolutions for tribes.  Additionally, the exit option for 
tribes from a treaty would be much more difficult to achieve than under a 
compact.  The problems with this approach under the evaluation criteria, 
despite its emotional appeal to some scholars and the fact that it implicitly 
grants tribes separate nation status, make it unviable. 
In sum, not one of the approaches based on the use of existing 
constitutional authority advances the tribes’ sovereignty cause much, if at 
all.  Further, if any approach did advance tribal sovereignty—like using the 
Treaty power to make tribes more like the federal government and less like 
states—the approach would probably provoke political opposition.  Under 
the Enclave, Compact, and Territories Clauses, power would continue to 
flow from Congress and thus lack permanence and retain its federal 
character. 
Even the Treaty Clause, which offers the clearest route to enhanced 
sovereignty for tribes, would be extremely difficult to implement given how 
many tribes there are and the differences among them.  Negotiating treaties 
like compacts could exacerbate those differences depending on the 
bargaining acumen of the tribal negotiators.  Treaties might increase the 
federal benefits that tribes now have and might improve their bargaining 
posture vis-à-vis the federal and state governments and, once negotiated, the 
benefits derived under them offer the most permanence of the options 
discussed. 
But, tribes bring little to the bargaining table that would either induce 
the federal government to enter into treaties with them, let alone negotiate 
terms that are favorable to tribes that Congress would then ratify.  Tribes 
who successfully negotiate treaties with the federal government begin to 
look like nations within a nation: an image that runs the risk of fracturing 
the Union as well as raising national security concerns.  Since none of the 
proposed solutions to diminished tribal sovereignty that relies on existing 
constitutional authority passes muster under the four evaluation criteria, it is 
time to see if the Constitution might be amended in a way that solves the 
problem.  The next part looks at three such amendments. 
B. AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION 
Anything that requires an amendment to the Constitution is 
problematic—the process is cumbersome and time-consuming, the results 
 
262.  Id.  at 583. 
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uncertain.263  The few times the Constitution has actually been amended 
(twenty-seven amendments involving seventeen separate instances) shows 
“an unusual degree of concern for the document’s stability,” as well as “a 
pervasive veneration of the Constitutions’ origins and in Americans’ 
general reluctance to alter it.”264  “For a constitution to create a democratic 
system that will remain democratic . . . the constitution’s authors must not 
only erect a framework of government, but must also ensure the stability of 
that framework, entrenching it to protect it from the very government it will 
empower”—in other words, it has to be more difficult to change 
constitutional text than to amend ordinary law for the original 
“constitutional endeavor” to succeed.265  One way of distinguishing 
constitutions from regular laws, therefore, is “their higher degree of formal 
entrenchment.”266 
On the other hand, the amendment process provides an educational 
opportunity for proponents to educate the public about the wisdom of and 
need for the amendment and for the ultimate decision to gain broad-based 
political support, as well as assure a constitutional basis for it.  Although a 
majority decision of the Supreme Court267 or shifts in popular opinions can 
change how constitutional text should be read and applied, the only way to 
permanently change the actual words in the Constitution is through Article 
V.268  Arguably the most important reason for “amend[ing] the Constitution 
to clearly define the place of Indian tribes within our federalism” is that it 
“would be the right thing to do”269—a view shared by Skibine and Frank 
 
263.  Amending the constitution requires a formal supermajoritarian process consisting of 
congressional action and ratification by three quarters of the states.  See U.S. CONST. art. V; see 
also Primus, supra note 177, at 1100; Versteeg & Zachin, supra note 186, at 21 (commenting that 
the U.S. Constitution is amongst the hardest to amend of all constitutions in the world). 
264.  Versteeg & Zachin, supra note 186, at 21. Versteeg and Zachin compare this low rate 
of amending the federal Constitution to the high rate of amendments to state constitutions, and 
they report that forty states enacted 8,267 amendments from 1776 to 2005. Id. at 46 n.249. 
265.  Id.  at 42.   
266.  Id. 
267.  Primus, supra note 177, at 1100. 
268.  Id.  at 1114.  Other factors that might tilt toward formal constitutional amendment are 
the clarity of the text the proponents want to revise, its visibility, salience, and the consistency of 
its interpretation over a sufficiently long period of time to make any change seem less like a 
departure from constitutional text and more like “the recovery of a correct but now-lost reading.”  
Id.  at 1103 n.59 (discussing the circumstances requiring the use of Article V, if change cannot be 
achieved through the judicial process when “the Court is standing up for a nontextual rule that is 
broadly unpopular outside the Court.”). 
269.  Skibine, supra note 33, at 45.  Because Skibine is pessimistic that this will never 
happen, he tasks the Court with “finding a way to fit Indian nations into our constitutional 
structure.”  Id. 
         
68 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:13 
 
Pommersheim, who believe the only way for tribes to be incorporated into 
our federalism is through a constitutional amendment.270 
While some of the proposals discussed in this section are startling, 
none creates a constitutional revolution.271  Rather, each is more consistent 
with a theory of constitutional evolution, reflecting the fact that “all 
constitutions are crafted over time,” their connotation gradually 
“determined by a dynamic fueled by their internal tensions and 
contradictions and their confrontations with a social order over which they 
have limited influence.”272  The extra-constitutional status of Indian tribes 
creates just such a tension and invites confrontation with a social order that 
currently excludes or dominates them in a way that is inconsistent with this 
country’s animating principles. 
Each of the proposals discussed in this section is designed to give tribes 
a place in the legislative process while respecting the existing electoral 
system.273  Such systems “are notoriously difficult to change, primarily 
because those people most able to make reforms are the beneficiaries of the 
status quo and thus unlikely to push for a new system.”274  Nonetheless, 
several of these proposals push the boundaries of those systems to achieve a 
measure of electoral justice for tribes.  “[E]lections implicate, and seek to 
realize, a range of democratic values,” including “the political equality of 
 
270.  Skibine, supra note 43, at 690 (agreeing with Pommersheim’s recommendation that a 
constitutional amendment is the best way to fit Indian tribes within the federal structure, to which 
Skibine adds such an amendment is “also probably necessary to accomplish a full constitutional 
incorporation within Our Federalism.”). 
271.  Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn, Revolution or Evolution:  The challenges of Constitutional 
Design, 48 TULSA L. REV. 235, 242 (2012) (book review) (a constitutional revolution occurs 
when there is a “paradigmatic displacement in the conceptual prism through which 
constitutionalism is experienced in a given polity.”). 
272.  Id.  at 244. 
273.  However, working within the existing system has produced very few Indian members 
of Congress and only one U.S. Senator—Senator Ben Knighthorse Campbell—who was elected in 
1993 from Colorado.  Martin, supra note 3.  A current republican senatorial candidate from 
Oklahoma is encountering thinly veiled racist opposition questioning his identity as an 
Oklahoman and loyalty to the United States.  Id. 
274.  Knight, supra note 66, at 1071.  This article does not propose changing the basic 
structure of the electoral system in the United States, which is currently a single member plurality 
system in which the candidate who wins a plurality of the votes in that district is elected to 
Congress.  For articles proposing changes to that system, see Rob Richie & Andrew Spencer, The 
Right Choice for Elections:  How Choice Voting Will End Gerrymandering and Expand Minority 
Voting Rights, from City Councils to Congress, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 959 (2013); Lauren R. 
Weinberg, Note, Reading the Tea Leaves:  The Supreme Court and the Future of Coalition 
Districts under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 411 (2013).  Trevor 
Knight blames this system for the under representation of Canada’s aboriginal peoples in that 
country’s parliament, especially because of their geographically dispersed condition, noting the 
difference between aboriginal peoples and, for example, “geographically concentrated ethnic 
communities.”  See Knight, supra note 66, at 1068-69. 
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all citizens . . . and ensur[e] that minorities are represented adequately in the 
halls of power.”275  Indian tribes have a “unique claim” to electoral justice 
based on “their ancestors having been the original inhabitants of the land, 
their status as identifiable nations, and their treaty relationships with the 
federal government.”276 
Representation in Congress “is a necessary condition for assessing the 
full practical benefits of participation in that political order.”277  Without 
congressional representatives, there is no one who will give voice to tribal 
concerns, reflect those needs in the legislative process, or help tribal 
members with problems regarding the federal bureaucracy.278  Lack of 
participation in Congress means tribes have less political influence in that 
body’s decision-making process, and it prevents tribes and their members 
“from fully accessing the benefits of a democratic system.”279  While 
greater representation in Congress would not necessarily “undue the wrongs 
of the past” done to tribes, it would “provide both short-term benefits and 
another avenue of dialogue and deliberation to be used in an effort to 
improve” their future.280 
Several of the proposals examined in this part of the article come from 
other countries with indigenous populations.  As enticing and useful as 
some of them are in advancing understanding of the complexity involved in 
their implementation, it is important to remember that the historical, social, 
and legal context of indigenous peoples in those countries is quite different 
from the United States.  These differences, therefore, constrain the 
wholesale adoption of foreign proposals without a more rigorous analysis 
than this article proposes to do.  Nonetheless, these non-United States 
approaches show that other countries are actively exploring ways to 
empower their indigenous peoples to protect and further their self-interest, 
which might give this country some incentive to do likewise.  These foreign 
solutions can also be instructive in helping to shape an eventual solution to 
the problem of diminished tribal sovereignty in this country and broaden 
 
275.  Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 283, 356 
(2014). 
276.  Knight, supra note 66, at 1065 (“Although other identifiable groups in society may 
have legitimate political claims for guaranteed representation in Parliament, the claim of 
Aboriginal people is the strongest.”). 
277.  Id.  at 1066 (discussing representation of aboriginals in Canada’s parliament).  See also 
id.  (“[T]he most likely positive results would stem from the legislative learning process that other 
M.P.’s would go through when faced with a larger number of Aboriginal colleagues.”).   
278.  Id.  at 1068. 
279.  Id.  
280.  Id.  at 1066 (discussing Canada’s aboriginal peoples and a proposal to increase their 
representation in Parliament).   
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awareness of the indirect benefits that might be achieved by any change in 
majority governance to improve the status of Indian tribes. 
The article subjects the proposed solutions presented below to the same 
criteria applied to the approaches based on existing constitutional text that 
were discussed above.  Two additional criteria spring from the nature of the 
amendment process.  First, the essence of any textual amendment must be 
“compatible with the document’s aspirational content,” i.e. consistent with 
“directives enshrined in key textual provisions” of the Constitution.281  To 
the extent the proposals are designed to eliminate barriers to the benefits of 
citizenship, such as participating in the electoral process, that criterion is 
easily met.282  The second criterion—that any textual change must occur “in 
an orderly legal manner”—should be assured by following the textual 
guidance for amending the Constitution.283 
1. Creation of a Tribal State(s)284 
The concept of a tribal state is not new. President Washington 
recommended that American Indian law focus on giving Indian tribes 
statehood status in the western lands,285 and the concept was being 
 
281.  Jacobsohn, supra note 271, at 235. 
282.  See Sari Horwitz, Justice Department considers making request that would add polling 
sites to tribal lands, WASH. POST, June 9, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ 
national-security/justice-department.com (“Standing by as Native voices, for whatever reason, are 
shut out of the democratic process is not an option . . . . This proposal would give American 
Indians and Alaskan Natives a polling place in their community, somewhere to cast their ballots 
and ensure their voices are heard—something unremarkable to most other citizens.”) (internal 
quotations omitted).  
283.  Jacobsohn, supra note 271, at 235. 
284.  This proposal is different from tribal territorially-based rights to off-reservation 
resources which can raise issues of co-management of “overlapping territory”—what Biolsi 
describes as “heteronomous political space in which more than one sovereign may exercise 
jurisdiction in coterminous space and in which political space itself is discontinuous.”  Biolsi, 
supra note 1, at 247.  Different also from the creation of what Biolsi calls “national indigenous 
space,” involving “supratribal indigenous rights within an inclusive space that ultimately spans all 
of the territory of the contiguous United States.”  Id.  at 240.  Biolsi cites, as an example of 
“national indigenous space,” the American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 1994, 
42 U.S.C. § 1996(a), stating this law produces a Native space in which Indian people have 
indigenous rights across the national landscape, not just within reservation enclaves and noting the 
existence of “[s]imilar national indigenous rights for Indians codified in federal law include access 
to eagle feathers in an exemption from the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act (16 U.S.C. § 
668(a)) and the right to a protected status for use of the phrase Indian made in the sale of artwork 
and crafts (Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 1159).”  Id. at 248.  Biolsi makes the 
point that these forms of what he calls “portable Indian status” allow urban Indians and those 
Indians who do not live on reservations to retain their identity and legal status as Indians as well 
as the right to practice their “indigenous cultures”—”their claim to Indianess”—even when they 
are surrounded by non-Indians.  Id. 
285.  Fletcher, supra note 46, at 165. 
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discussed well into the next century.286  Since the new tribal state or states 
would be created out of an existing state, unless Congress or the state 
within whose borders the new state would be created consented, an 
amendment to the Constitution is required.287 
A separate fully autonomous tribal state could be vested with the same 
powers as non-Indian states and could accrete jurisdiction and authority 
now resting in the federal government and the states.288  The new tribal 
state would be entitled to full representation in both the Senate and the 
House and thus would be fully integrated into structure of governance on a 
parallel with non-tribal states.  One advantage that Canada has over the 
United States in making this approach work is that since “[b]and councils 
and other Aboriginal forms of governance are viewed as a part of the 
constitutional structure of Canada in a similar manner to the federal and 
provincial orders of government,”289 the transfer of jurisdiction and 
authority to aboriginal bands could occur within the same constitutional 
framework that includes Canadian provinces without amending the 
underlying charter.  This is not the situation in the United States. 
Abele and Prince examine the creation of a new province representing 
Canada’s entire aboriginal population.290  They call this approach “adapted 
federalism” because it requires the creation of a “new form of public 
government.”291  Their proposed new province would collect “all the 
 
286.  See generally GEORGE A. SCHULTZ, AN INDIAN CANAAN, ISAAC MCCOY AND THE 
VISION OF AN INDIAN STATE (1972). 
287.  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 (“New States may be admitted by the Congress into this 
Union; but no new States shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor 
any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or parts of States, without the Consent 
of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.”).  See also Skibine, supra 
note 43, at 689 (“[T]he ultimate question is whether the current political incorporation, based on a 
plenary power paradigm, can be changed to at least a quasi-constitutional incorporation based on a 
self-determination paradigm.  The first question is whether Congress has the plenary power to 
incorporate the tribes as a third sovereign within Our Federalism.  One argument against the 
possibility of such constitutional incorporation is that while Congress can add new territories, 
Congress can only incorporate such territories as federal territories or as states.”). 
288.  Abele & Prince, supra note 13, at 578 (“The view of public power in this model is that 
the totality of legislative powers is vested with the federal and provincial governments.  Through 
treaty negotiations, interim measures, administrative arrangements, and policy innovations, certain 
jurisdictions and authorities can be transferred to Aboriginal governments and institutions.”). 
289.  Id.  
290.  Id.  at 575.  The authors note that one province—Saskatchewan—is becoming an 
aboriginal province because of demographic changes.  Id.  (“[T]he existing province of 
Saskatchewan is well on the way to becoming an Aboriginal province in at least one sense: 
demographic projections indicate that Aboriginal people will probably form the majority of the 
electorate of the province by the middle of this century.”). 
291.  Id.  at 574 (“‘[A]dapted federalism’ does incorporate a significant change: creation of a 
new form of public government as a consequence of the renegotiation of an Aboriginal 
collectivity’s relationship with the federation.”). 
         
72 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:13 
 
disparate Aboriginal nations and peoples, in all their various political forms, 
into one body for the purpose of participation in the federation.”  But 
because the new province would not have a single contiguous territory, it 
would be unique in the Canadian federal structure.292 
The authors admit that the approach would create difficult 
implementation problems given the differences among Canada’s First 
Nations.293  They speculate that existing provinces would oppose the 
creation of a new province because it would dilute their power and their 
respective share of the federal fiscal pie,294 and they predict the general 
public might object to such “a large change in Canada’s constitutional 
order.”295  Additionally, the proposal creates the allusion, perhaps the 
reality, of “race-based governments or ethnic enclaves,” as well as the loss 
of private resource development opportunities in those reserves, if land is 
transferred out of the public domain to the new tribal province.296  All these 
concerns are potential sources of public opposition in the United States. 
Conversely, the authors suggest that there would be obvious benefits to 
creating a fully empowered aboriginal province and incorporating it “as a 
new order” into Canadian federalism.  These include eliminating tensions 
between the federal, provincial, and aboriginal governments and the 
“unacceptable social conditions that keep Indian peoples from contributing 
to the country’s progress.”297 
If Aboriginal peoples are to exercise their self-governing powers 
within the context of Canada’s federal system, then federal and 
 
292.  Id.  at 575. 
293.  Id.  (identifying the questions to be answered:  “[H]ow to organize elite representation 
of such a varied population?  Given the variety of governing forms, how to distribute funds within 
the province?”).  See also Dorris, supra note 27, at 63 (“Perhaps it is inevitable that no single 
individual, the product of a particular tribe and experiential background can successfully represent 
such a diversity of interests . . . .”). 
294.  Abele & Prince, supra note 13, at 587 (“It is unlikely, as discussed earlier, that there 
will be much Aboriginal demand for ‘adaptation’ of the federation by creating new provinces or 
territories.  Should such demand surface—from Labrador perhaps, where residents note that the 
level of public-sector funding for infrastructure is much better in the territories—provinces would 
likely accept a new territory (which would remain a federal fiscal responsibility) but resist a new 
province.  They would be concerned about dilution of provincial power and the financial 
implications of sharing the equalization pie with what would almost certainly be another have-not’ 
province.”). 
295.  Id.  at 587. 
296.  Id.  at 579.  Another reason that Abele and Prince cite is the loss of property tax 
revenue, which does not apply to Indian lands because those lands are not taxed.  Abele and 
Prince see the overall effect of such a proposal to be the “fragmentation rather than convergence” 
of Canada, which would not be a good thing. Id. at 587. 
297.  Id.  at 579 (adding “[i]n a democratic age, it is incongruous to maintain any people in a 
state of dependency. Ending dependency would stimulate self-confidence and social 
regeneration.”) (internal quotation mark and citation omitted).  
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provincial governments must make room for this to happen. 
Instead of being divided between two orders of government, 
government powers will have to be divided among three orders.  
This is a major change and one that will require goodwill, 
flexibility, co-operation, imagination and courage on the part of all 
concerned.298 
In the United States, given the constitutional prohibition against the 
creation of a new state within the jurisdiction of an existing state, a 
constitutional amendment would be necessary to create any tribal state.  
Assuming that such an amendment was possible, the dilemma of which 
tribes might qualify for statehood status, how many tribal states should be 
created, and which states would lose land to a new tribal state(s) all still 
remain.299  One less administratively complex, constitutionally fraught, and 
more politically salient approach might be to adopt Abele and Prince’s idea 
of aggregating all tribes into a single “virtual” province, here a virtual state, 
thus skirting the constitutional problem, assured resistance, and the 
administrative complexities of creating an actual new state.300 
The tribal state approach fits tribes within the existing federal 
framework and brings them into the Constitution by making them co-equal 
sovereigns with the states, thus enhancing their power and sovereign status.  
But, the approach presents significant practical problems in trying to 
determine how many new tribal states should be created, what tribes they 
might encompass, what would happen to non-Indian in-holdings on tribal 
lands, and whether individuals in tribal states would necessarily elect tribal 
Senators and representatives as opposed to non-Indian ones.  Further, the 
approach does not address the problem of landless or urban Indians, unless 
those individuals are affiliated with a particular tribe, and it would likely be 
opposed by states that might view the approach as reducing their power 
base.  Finally, states based on tribal identity would be ethnic-based political 
units of which there are no others in this country. 
2. Reserved Congressional Tribal Seats 
One way to enhance the political effectiveness of sub-national groups 
like Indian tribes is to give them voting representation in the House of 
 
298.  Id.  at 578 (quoting Final Report, ROYAL COMMISSION ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES 2:5 
(1996)). 
299.  Id.  at 577. 
300.  The idea of a virtual state is revisited in the form of a single nationwide virtual electoral 
district later in the article.   
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Representatives by reserving or dedicating specific seats for them. 
Interestingly, the concept of dedicated Indian seats is not entirely foreign to 
this country.  Maine has had Indian representatives in dedicated seats in its 
state legislature since 1823 (Penobscot Nation) and 1842 (Passamaquoddy 
Tribe),301 and Wisconsin’s legislature has studied the concept.302 
Tribal representatives can proffer an Indian perspective on issues of 
importance to Indians like environmental protection, use of natural 
resources, health, education, and social and criminal justice.303  
Incorporating tribal representatives into the House also moves that body 
closer to “mirror representation,”304 where “the characteristics of the 
representative body mirror[s] the characteristics of those being 
represented.”305  Mirror representation assumes that “people must share 
certain characteristics to understand fully the perspective of others with 
those characteristics” and that no amount of empathy can enable a person 
without those characteristics to “jump the barriers of experience.”  Even if 
some representatives could jump that barrier, “they could not be trusted to 
do so to promote minority interests.”306 
 
301.  S. Glenn Starbird, Jr. et al., supra note 220 (noting that this situation probably pre-
dated the Revolution). Indian representatives of these two tribes served continuously until 1941, 
when for a brief period they were ousted from “the Hall of the House”; their status reduced to 
little better than state paid lobbyists.  Id.  Speaking and seating privileges were restored in 1975.  
Id.  The ouster occurred after an attempt to place the Indian representatives on a nearly equal 
footing with non-Indian representatives.  Id.  In 1996, tribal representatives for the first time in the 
state legislatures entire history, sponsored a Native Bill (An Act to Place Penobscot Land in 
Trust), which was enacted.  Id.  A rules change in 1999, allowed the tribal representatives to  
co-sponsor any bill statewide.  Id.  A third band of Indians—the Houlton Band of Maliseet 
Indians—were added to the Joint Rules in 2010 when the 125th Legislature adopted rules changes 
granting that band the same privileges as the other two tribes, including:  seats on the floor of the 
state House of Representatives, the privilege of speaking on pending legislation with the speaker’s 
consent, and the right to serve on any joint standing committee as non-voting members.  Id.  In 
any report of a committee on which a tribal member serves, their position must be noted and 
included.  Id.  Going further, by granting tribal representatives full voting rights, might have 
violated both the Maine and the United States constitutions.  Id.  
302.  Id.  (discussing Wisconsin, New Brunswick, and New Zealand legislatures’ reviewing 
the representative status of their respective aboriginal tribes).  New Zealand has had a system of 
guaranteed legislative representation for its Maori people since 1867.  Knight, supra note 66, at 
1073. 
303.  Glynn Evans & Lisa Hill, The Electoral and Political Implications of Reserved Seats 
for Indigenous Australians, 47 AUSTL. J. OF POL. SCI. 491, 492-93 (2012). 
304.  Id.  at 492.  Mirror representation, besides improving representation for minority 
groups in governing bodies, also increases these groups’ “electoral salience, group pride and trust 
in government.”  Id. 
305.  Id.  See also Stephanopoulos, supra note 275, at 314 (“The essence of [minimalist] 
democracy . . . is that the interests (preferences, values, opinions) of the population . . . be 
represented in government.”) (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND 
DEMOCRACY 165 (2003)).  
306.  Knight, supra note 66, at 1084. 
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Taking the additional step of reserving or dedicating those seats for 
tribal representatives is a way of offsetting Indians’ lower population 
numbers and addressing “the legacy of their historical dispossession.”307  
Guaranteed separate representation for indigenous peoples can achieve “a 
certain minimum guaranteed level of representation” as well as affirm their 
“political distinctiveness.”308  Adding dedicated tribal congressional seats 
might sensitize non-Indian members of Congress to the unique perspective 
of Indians as well as their goals and needs.309  Tribes would become direct 
players in the legislative process, where they are now outside observers at 
most.  Their presence in Congress would help ensure “that issues of concern 
to minorities [e.g. Indians] stay on the political agenda” and, through the 
“moral force” they bring, they would be a reminder to the government “to 
act in a way sensitive to the concerns” of Indians.310 
Bringing indigenous voices into the lawmaking body thus helps assure 
that its actions are representative of the full “range of identities that 
constitute a society” and the ultimate actions of that body will be more 
just.311  Speaking with respect to Australia’s aboriginal peoples and the 
country’s governing institutions, John Chesterman commented that “[a] 
political system has legitimacy problems when the most historically 
significant and perennially most marginalized and disadvantaged minority 
group is unable to have a single representative in the federal Parliament.”312 
That said, adding reserved tribal seats to the House of Representatives 
would require an amendment to the Constitution, as it radically changes the 
current population-based representational model for the House found in the 
Constitution.313  Not amending the Constitution to achieve this result might 
 
307.  Evans & Hill, supra note 303, at 493.  Evans and Hill report that the New Zealand 
experience with reserved seats has increased the voting participation of Maori citizens and 
improved “levels of political efficacy and trust in government.”  Id. 
308.  Knight, supra note 66, at 1075. 
309.  Id.  at 1081. 
310.  Id.  at 1079.  
311.  John Chesterman, Chosen by the People?  How Federal Parliamentary Seats Might Be 
Reserved for Indigenous Australians without Changing the Constitution, 34 FED. L. REPT. 261, 
265 (2006).  See also Stephanopoulos, supra note 275, at 314 (“Madison wrote that ‘it is 
particularly essential that [the House] should have an immediate dependence on, and an intimate 
sympathy with, the people.’”) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 52 (James Madison), at 347 
(Harvard Univ. Press ed. 2009)).  
312.  Chesterman, supra note 311, at 284. 
313.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (“Representatives shall be apportioned among the 
several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in 
each State, excluding Indians not taxed.”).  Similar problems are not created for tribal 
representation in the Senate, as each state is entitled to two Senators regardless of population. 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment authorizing Congress to “enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions” of the Amendment, raises an interesting question as to whether that 
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run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause’s “one person, one vote 
principle”314 because according tribal representatives full membership in 
the House would dilute the votes of those members who have been duly 
elected based on population.  Another constitutional problem, which could 
only be cured by amendment, might arise from tribal representatives being 
elected according to traditional methods for selecting tribal officers and thus 
not be selected in accordance with Article I, clause 3.  This would mean that 
they cannot be full “members” of the House of Representatives, entitled to 
vote.315  A further inequality, unless corrected for, would be introduced by 
tribal electors having two votes for their representative(s) in every election, 
as they also are regular electors in general elections.316 
Moreover, there are logistical problems with dedicating specific seats 
for tribal representatives.317  For example, how many dedicated indigenous 
seats in relation to non-indigenous seats should there be, and how should 
those representatives be elected—during the general elections or at special 
elections?318  Could tribal members vote for tribal representatives and non-
Indian representatives?  Would every state or voting district have a reserved 
 
language gives Congress the latitude to interpret the Amendment in a way that allows for 
designated tribal seats in the House.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
314.  Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964).   
315.  Michael v. Anderson, 817 F. Supp. 126, 140 (D.D.C. 1993) (holding that allowing 
territorial representatives to vote in the Committee of the Whole constituted an exercise of 
legislative power and was, therefore, unconstitutional but for the presence of a savings clause 
which allowed for a de novo vote by the full House excluding the territorial representatives, if 
there vote was decisive). 
316.  This distinguishes tribes from non-voting representatives from those U.S. territories 
who only get to vote because they have no other representatives in Congress. Starbrid et al., supra 
note 301.  See also Michael v. Anderson, 14 F.3d 623, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding the House 
Rule that allowed territorial delegates to vote in the Committee of the Whole constitutional 
because it does not “bestow membership” on those delegates).  In New Zealand, Maoris are 
allowed to vote for either a general constituency seat or for a separate Maori seat, of which there 
are five. Knight, supra note 66, at 1075. 
317.  Evans & Hill, supra note 303, at 495.  See also id.  at 498-500 (illustrating the 
complexity of this process in Australia).  See also Chesterman, supra note 311, at 280-84 
(identifying three solutions each for the Australian Senate and three for its House of 
Representatives:  (1) An indigenous Senator for each state; (2) an Indigenous Senator for states 
with high Indigenous populations (could lead to under-representation of some Indigenous people); 
(3) three Indigenous Senators elected on a rotating basis (complicated); (4) six Indigenous House 
of Representative seats (each state would have one Indigenous member of the House of 
Representatives); (5) four Indigenous House of Representatives seats (allotted to only those states 
with large Indigenous populations, which could lead to same under-representation as the Senate 
proposal); (5) four Indigenous House of Representatives seats where all indigenous electors could 
vote for a representative and allow entire states to join together to create one electorate such that 
seats created under this approach would not be ‘parts’ of different states, but created out of the 
“entirety of different States.”) (emphasis contained in original). 
318.  Evans & Hill, supra note 303, at 493-94.  Evans and Hill have tried to map out how 
this would work in Australian elections.  See id.  at 495. 
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tribal seat, regardless of the percentage of Indians in the relevant 
population?319  Since there are probably fewer tribal voters in each election 
district when compared to the general population in the surrounding area, it 
may be hard to justify any dedicated seats for tribal representatives.320 
Another potential objection to this solution is that there might be too 
few reserved tribal seats to make a difference.321  This could result in tribal 
representatives being marginalized because they might have problems 
securing the support of the two major parties,322 thus not fulfilling the goal 
of enhancing tribal sovereignty.323  This problem might be offset by giving 
a tribal representative a weighted vote, which might have political salience 
because it would enhance the attractiveness of tribes to non-Indian interest 
groups.  A weighted vote would increase the tribes’ ability to logroll to their 
economic and political advantage, although it would not give them a 
superior advantage to other interest groups or political units.  However, 
according tribal representatives weighted votes, although morally defensible 
from an historic perspective and practicably understandable as a means of 
enhancing the ability of tribes to participate in the legislative process, might 
well generate political and public opposition to the appearance of special 
treatment. 
What’s more, the creation of reserved tribal seats could create 
problems for urban Indians who are not attached to a separate land base and 
 
319.  Id.  at 502 (discussing the special problems in Tasmania). 
320.  Id.  at 492.  See also Chesterman, supra note 311, at 267 (“New Zealand has reserved 
seats for Maori since 1867, and currently reserves for Maori representatives seven out of a 
minimum 120 parliamentary seats.”).  
321.  The increasing political clout of tribes has been reflected in their growing political 
contributions and has created its own backlash.  See Martin, supra note 3 (quoting Keith Gaddie, a 
University of Oklahoma political science professor, as saying “[m]ost people didn’t worry about 
the Indians in part because they were everywhere, they sort of looked like everybody else . . . . 
Nobody cared about Native Americans until they got money.”).  The tribes make no secret of the 
fact that they want a tribal member in the Senate.  Id. 
322.  Evans & Hill, supra note 303, at 493-94.  For example, their small number and lack of 
power within the majority party may prevent tribal legislators from influencing the legislative 
agenda set by party leadership.  Additionally, tribal legislators may be placed on committees of 
limited importance; and supermajority voting rules and the importance of the Senate also give 
power to the dominant party, as does the need to align the President with the tribal legislators’ 
agenda.  See Stephanopoulos, supra note 275, at 364.  Although these remarks were made with 
respect to the lack of legislative power of the “median legislator”—the legislator who occupies the 
middle as opposed to an extreme position—they could apply equally to tribal legislators.  Id.  
323.  Chesterman, supra note 311, at 266 (referring to his problem as “tokenistic.”).  See also 
Knight, supra note 66, at 1080 (“There is the potential for something deeply problematic in the 
election of representatives who in the end can be outvoted or ignored on any given issue.”).  But 
see Chesterman, supra note 311, at 266 (disagreeing, and saying disempowerment would only 
occur “if the representatives were to have observer and not voting status.”). 
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are integrated into the non-Indian voting population.324  The existence of 
dedicated tribal seats could lessen the obligation of non-tribal members to 
take account of the perspective of Indians in the legislative process.325  
Since occupants of the tribal seats might vote more often with the 
Democratic Party because of its greater alignment on issues of concern to 
tribes, the sudden appearance of reserved tribal seats could change the 
current balance between the two dominant parties, which would trigger 
opposition from whichever party that felt its power base was being 
eroded.326  Adding dedicated tribal seats would also reduce the number of 
non-Indian House seats, which might trigger voter opposition in those states 
whose non-ethnic based congressional seats would be transformed. 
In addition, there may be a justified fear that the presence of these 
groups could “balkanize” the legislature, as other “marginalized” groups 
might seek special status based on ethnicity, sexual orientation, or religious 
customs.327  Counter arguments that Indian tribes “present a unique case for 
guaranteed representation” because they have political coherence as tribes, 
because as “prior occupants of the land, they exercised sovereignty over the 
territory before the appearance of Europeans,” and because some of them 
are still in treaty relationships with the federal government, may not 
prevail.328  Flooding the legislature with dedicated seats based on unique 
minority interests might further institutionalize the fragmentation of the 
legislature into voting blocs based on each group’s perceived interests 
instead of the broader public good.329 
 
324.  Evans and Hill propose that urban Indians be given a choice of voting in any dedicated 
tribal district, even though it is not their own, or vote in the unrestricted voting district in which 
they live. Evans & Hill, supra note 303, at 499.  However, this solution adds to the complexity of 
any designed structural solution to the problem and could weaken the strength of dedicated tribal 
voting districts. 
325.  Knight, supra note 66, at 1080.  Knight reports that critics of affirmative districting in 
the United States “complain that it leads to ‘ghettoization’ or political marginalization of 
minorities.”  Id. 
326.  Evans and Hill reach this conclusion with respect to Aboriginal candidates more likely 
to align themselves with the Labor Party.  Evans & Hill, supra note 303, at 496. 
327.  See Knight, supra note 66, at 1088 (“The histories of racism and discrimination faced 
by Aboriginal people in Canada and African-Americans in the U.S. have created politically salient 
identities centered on these characteristics, and the same factors that create the political identity 
often prevent that identity from finding proportionate expression in the present system.”).  See 
also id.  (“The evidence that does exist in Canada, however, combined with the evidence of the 
importance of race in the United States, suggests that groups that have been the subject of 
systemic racial discrimination have legitimate claims of separate representation.”). 
328.  Id.  at 1091.   
329.  Chesterman, supra note 311, at 266.  But cf. id.  at 284 (explaining that tribes who are 
“uniquely identifiable group[s] with unique historical claims and particularly pressing policy 
needs” should not cause the door to open wider to other demands for special status, and asserting 
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Taking balkanization a step further, the idea of special seats reserved 
for individuals of a particular ethnic identity might perpetuate racial 
distinctions in American society and amount to “a form of political 
apartheid.”330  Insisting that only members of the same group can represent 
the interests of that group “essentialize[s] individuals to one identity, be it 
race, gender, or language” when in actuality people have “many identities, 
and it is impossible to say which will be most politically salient on any 
given issue.”331  The proposal also requires ignoring “cleavages” and 
differences between tribes and between tribal members who live on 
reservations and Indians who live in urban areas and are unaffiliated with a 
particular tribe.332 
Finally, the proposal may alienate tribes who consider themselves to be 
independent sovereign nations; such tribes might view their participation in 
the governance structure of the dominant society as legitimizing the 
colonial state and its institutions.333  Guaranteed representation in Congress 
would be inconsistent with the nation-to-nation status that they ascribe to, 
especially because it could result in the assimilation of tribes into the 
majority electorate.  In this view, specialized tribal election districts would 
serve as little more than “an electoral device” to bring the experience of 
“differentiated [tribal] citizenship” into unwanted “full participatory status” 
in Congress.334  For those tribes, their membership in the legislative body of 
another nation would be inappropriate, as would compelling compliance 
with state electoral rules and state-run elections.335  Sovereignty to those 
tribes suggests that tribal representatives would be mere “ambassadors” to 
Congress since they could not actually be members.336 
 
that “a special case exists for Indigenous Australians to have proportionate representation in the 
national governing body.”). 
330.  Knight, supra note 66, at 1083. 
331.  Id.  at 1084. 
332.  Id. at 1088 (admitting that any proposal based on “a proportionate number of 
guaranteed Aboriginal seats will end up subsuming a number of salient political differences” 
within any single election district). 
333.  Catherine J. Iorns, Dedicated Parliamentary Seats for Indigenous Peoples:  Political 
Representation as an Element of Indigenous Self-Determination, 10 MURDOCH U. ELECTRONIC J. 
OF L. 1, 14 (2003).  See also Knight, supra note 66, at 1092 (“Many Aboriginal people do not 
participate in elections precisely because they do not recognize the authority of the Canadian state, 
and it is felt that exercising the franchise would constitute such a recognition.”).  See also id.  at 
1093 (“What it boils down to is we are saying, we are a nation and, by becoming part of someone 
else’s system, we are going to give that up.”) (quoting G. Hamilton, Chiefs Reject Offer of 
Guaratneed Seats in N.B. Legislature: Unanimous in Opposition, NAT’L POST,  March 23, 1999, 
at A5)).  
334.  Knight, supra note 66, at 1093 (internal citation omitted). 
335.  Iorns, supra note 333, at 9. 
336.  Id.  at 10. 
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Effectiveness, implementation challenges, inclusiveness, and political 
salience may be serious problems with dedicated tribal seats in Congress.  
The approach might additionally create instability within Congress, if the 
numbers became large enough to create a voting bloc of tribal 
representatives.  Thus, the formation of tribal states and the creation of 
dedicated tribal congressional seats are both problematic.  Both would do 
little to enhance the power of tribes to protect their interests in Congress 
unless their numbers were sufficiently large to constitute a meaningful 
voting bloc—the achievement of which might end up being insufficiently 
inclusive of both Indians and non-Indians, and create divisions among 
tribes. 
Norway has taken a slightly different tack and established a separate 
parliament in 1989 for its indigenous peoples, known as Sami.337  The 
reason given for not integrating Sami into the Norwegian Parliament is that 
the small size of the Sami population (less than 1% of the country’s total 
population) makes it inappropriate338—a reason that resonates here.339  The 
Norwegian Sami Parliament meets four times a year.  Its thirty-nine 
representatives are elected by Sami members of the Norwegian population 
enrolled in an electoral register just for Sami peoples.  The elections occur 
with the same frequency and at the same time as the country’s elections for 
its National Parliament.340  There are regular meetings between the 
Norwegian government and representatives of the Sami Parliament, and an 
agreement between the two requires that each keep the other informed 
about policy matters and decisions directly affecting the Sami.341 
The Norwegian Sami Parliament provides a forum for Sami to debate 
issues relating to their communities.342  It also functions as an advisory 
body to the Norwegian government and distributes government funds for 
the promotion and preservation of Sami culture.343  Although the Sami 
 
337.  Indigenous Representation:  The Sami Parliaments of Norway, Sweden & Finland 
Offer an Inspiring Story and a Potential Solution to the Challenges of Improving Indigenous to 
Non-Indigenous Relations and Giving Indigenous Peoples a Voice within Contemporary Political 
Structures, NORDIC SOLUTIONS (Sept. 16, 2013), http://nordicsolutions.co/indigenous-
representation/. 
338.  Id. 
339.  American Indians constitute approximately 0.9 percent of the total U.S. population.  
Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 Census Shows America’s Diversity (Mar. 24, 2011), 
http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/2010_census/cb11_cn125 html. 
340.  Indigenous Representation, supra note 337. 
341.  Id. 
342.  Several of the Parliament’s subcommittees reflect demographic differences in the Sami 
population; others deal with specific issues of concern to the Sami.  Id. 
343.  Id. 
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Parliament does not have much, if any, political power, it has symbolic 
significance for the Sami in a country that has a “culturally oppressive 
history of assimilation . . . .”344 
While this approach would offer minimal disruption to the current 
power distribution in this country, and thus would not be as politically 
controversial as giving tribes dedicated congressional seats, it also offers no 
increase in power for tribes.  An increase in power under this scheme would 
require the addition of some binding authority on the executive branch 
requiring it to implement the Indian Congress’s initiatives or giving the 
Indian Congress the power to veto federal or state legislation that conflicts 
with its own legislation.345  To be assured of any beneficial effect for tribes 
and permanence, the concept would have to be brought into the 
Constitution in some way, perhaps under section five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.346  To the extent there is value in a single tribal voice 
representing putative “pan-Indian” interests, then an Indian Congress that 
congeals these interests into unitary positions holds at least some symbolic 
value when that voice is carried into the congressional debate on measures 
that affect tribes across a wide spectrum.  In addition, a separate Indian 
Congress would not conflict with the desires of those Indians who do not 
want to be merged into the majority’s governance structure.347 
3. Treating Tribes as Separate Election Districts or as a Single 
 Nationwide Election District 
Another approach involves establishing separate tribal election districts 
within a single state, spanning several states, or covering the entire 
 
344.  Id. 
345.  An even less satisfactory solution for tribes in terms of maximizing their political 
influence is the creation of Indigenous community Cabinets to enable direct “input of indigenous 
views” into the Executive branch.  See Iorns, supra note 333, at 15. 
346.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by 
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”).  The Supreme Court has cabined 
Congress’ powers under section five, requiring that the legislation be congruent and proportional 
to the constitutional harm it seeks to remedy.  See generally Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 
(2004) (supporting and expounding on that principle); Nev. Dept’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 
U.S. 721 (2003); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 
U.S. 507 (1997).  
347.  An alternative approach might be the creation of a tribal legislative body within the 
House of Representatives (like the former Joint Indian Committee on Indian Affairs), composed 
of tribal representatives who could then advise on matters of concern to various tribes within the 
legislative body.  It might be specifically tasked with the responsibility to “ascertain community 
and political support for dedicated seats, and devise an appropriate model in consultation with 
Aboriginal communit[ies].”  Iorns, supra note 333, at 23 n.60 (citations omitted). 
         
82 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:13 
 
country.348  This approach would require an amendment to the Constitution 
because the new members represent a discrete subset of a state’s or multiple 
states’ overall population and, therefore, are not elected according to the 
Constitution.  Further, unless modified by an amendment, each member of 
the subgroup would have the equivalent of more than one vote.349 
The creation of special tribal election districts has the advantage of 
maintaining the existing federal structure by treating regional groupings of 
tribes the same as states from a representational standpoint, but it does not 
require the formation of additional states.350  Tribes within an identified 
election district would have to negotiate among themselves and with the 
surrounding states to gain maximum leverage in the legislative body—like 
local governments in a state.  This might bring disparate tribes closer 
together and encourage the formation of political alliances with  
non-Indians.  It would also enable non-Indian congressional representatives 
from special tribal districts to pursue matters of particular interest to Indians 
without alienating their non-Indian constituent, which can happen when 
Indians are elected from regular election districts.351  The proposal would 
align tribal “voters’ partisan and policy preferences” with those of their 
elected representatives and “match” those preferences within each tribal 
 
348.  States often consider a variety of factors in drawing the boundaries of election districts.  
See Stephanopoulos, supra note 275, at 343 (“many states impose additional line-drawing criteria 
such as compactness, respect for political subdivisions, and respect for communities of interest”). 
349.  An amendment might be necessary to avoid the constitutional bar against creating 
states out of existing states, as each tribal election district has the appearance of a carve out from 
the existing election district.  See Evans & Hill, supra note 303, at 503 (discussing this problem 
under Section 29 of the Australian Constitution, and saying “[t]he main problem with the model, 
which Chesterman foresees, is doubt about its constitutionality.  Section 29 of the Constitution 
states (in part) that ‘A division shall not be formed out of parts of different states.’”).  The authors 
suggest allowing Aboriginal peoples to vote in the district they represent, thus assuring the 
election of a territory-based electorate.  Id.  An additional problem that might be avoided by an 
amendment is circumventing Supreme Court decisions casting constitutional doubt on election 
districts whose boundaries are drawn in such a way as to ensure better minority representation in 
Congress.  See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) (striking down a geographically 
compact affirmatively gerrymandered election district and allowing a state to do this only upon a 
showing that the boundary had not been set in a way that subordinated traditional districting 
factors, such as “compactness, contiguity, respect for political subdivisions or communities 
defined by actual shared interests.”);  Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (creation of election 
districts to ensure that a widely dispersed African-American minority population constituted a 
majority in two congressional races); Knight, supra note 66, at 1097-99.  However, since tribes 
are considered to be political—not racial—groups, this body of case law should not apply to them. 
350.  The proposal for a separate tribal election district is not that different from at-large 
districts like Alaska, Delaware, Montana, North and South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming as 
well as the District of Columbia; the difference being that more than one candidate to represent 
the entire district’s population would be elected. 
351.  Knight, supra note 66, at 1090 (making this point with respect to Aboriginal 
constituents). 
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election district “and the jurisdiction as a whole.”352  There would also be 
no fracturing of national or state boundaries, as those would remain intact, 
and no threat to national security, which might occur if tribes had political 
status equivalent to the federal government as might happen in the case of 
treaty federalism. 
However, figuring out what the boundaries of each of these individual 
or regional election districts should be and determining how many elected 
representatives each should have would be extremely difficult.353  An 
additional problem is how to distinguish tribes from other subnational 
governments like counties and cities, which might feel equally entitled to 
additional representation in the House.  Applying the same approach to 
cities and counties would flood the House with new members, making that 
body’s work more difficult.  Although tribes are fewer in number than cities 
or counties and would be fewer still if grouped into regional units, this 
“fairness” concern could translate into political opposition to the proposal 
unless cities and counties see tribes as useful allies in Congress.  Finally, as 
with dedicated tribal seats, voters might object to the change in the ethnicity 
of their representatives. 
The creation of a virtual nationwide tribal election district, whose 
representatives reflect the overall percentage of Indians in the total U.S. 
population, might avert all of the administrative complexities of this 
approach.354  In this virtual election district, Indians, who comprise 
approximately .9 percent of the total U.S. population,355 would elect seven 
of the 435 congressional representatives.  There would be no need to give 
those members additional votes any more than representatives from states 
with small populations have additional votes, thus avoiding that potential 
source of opposition.  Such a district would include urban Indians and 
would not privilege the larger tribes or areas with large Indian populations. 
The proposal should also pose less of a threat to the prevailing political 
party balance in Congress because there would be fewer Indian 
 
352.  Stephanopoulos, supra note 275, at 304.  See also id.  at 347 (“I have found that House 
members’ voting records correspond more closely to key district attributes in geographically 
homogeneous constituencies, but to partisanship in spatially diverse districts.”). 
353.  Canada’s electoral laws permit consideration of communities of interest or group 
interests in redrawing election district boundaries.  See Knight, supra note 66, at 1085-86. 
354.  Trevor Knight proposes a comparable approach by suggesting that Canada move to a 
system of proportional representation, which would allow voters, either across a given province or 
the entire country, “to combine their votes behind specific candidates” or a slate of candidates, 
thus eliminating “the geographic bias” of the single member plurality electoral system and 
allowing aboriginal peoples to become more integrated into Canadian culture should they no 
longer want to be a separate community from the “electoral mainstream.”  Id.  at 1114-15. 
355.  Press Release, supra note 339.  
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representatives than if such an approach were undertaken on an individual 
state or even regional basis.  In addition, it would not result in the ethnicity 
of any state’s representatives changing.  Tribes would have to negotiate 
among themselves to produce a slate of tribal candidates and unified 
legislative positions.  It might even bring in tribes who do not want to 
participate directly in the legislative process because of a perceived 
diminution in their independent nation state status.  Tribes would not have 
to participate in the electoral process under this approach if they did not 
want to, and could exit at any time, with the caveat that if too many tribes 
opted out, the approach might lose its effectiveness. 
The creation of a single virtual election district for Indians should not 
balkanize Congress, if done only for Indians, but would reduce the number 
of non-Indian representatives, thus potentially creating political opposition 
to it.  However, that opposition would be diffused because it is not 
preordained which state would lose members.  Further, it might be muted as 
states realize they can negotiate with tribal representatives to assure their 
non-Indian constituents’ interests are being met, potentially enhancing tribal 
political power to protect Indian interests.  The creation of a virtual 
nationwide election district that encompasses all tribes regardless of their 
size, resources, or geographic location for the selection of tribal 
representatives would additionally assure the preservation of differences 
among tribes and could be inclusive of all tribes.  It thus offers the potential 
for a uniform solution to the problem.356 
Thus, a virtual nationwide tribal election district could have political 
salience, enhance the ability of tribes to function within the federal 
framework, be sufficiently inclusive to ameliorate differences among tribes, 
and fit within the existing constitutional framework.  In many ways, the 
mechanics of the proposal are similar to the Norwegian Sami Parliament 
where elected Sami tribal members come together to vote on a slate of 
aboriginal initiatives.  Here, the purpose of such a gathering would be to 
 
356.  The idea of a virtual election district corresponds to what Biolsi interchangeably calls 
“political space” or “political geography” and is occupied by people of different cultures, which 
transcends any geopolitical boundary and has no attachment to land.  See Biolsi, supra note 1, at 
251; see also id.  at 240 (“[t]he nation-state is only one among several (perhaps many) political 
geographies imagined, lived, and even institutionalized under modernity by American Indians.”)  
Tribes already occupy a virtual political space when they fight the dominant culture over the 
names of sports teams and their mascots.  Id.  at 241. Biolsi sees these fights as neither particularly 
Indian nor tribal, but as “a matter of U.S. citizens in U.S. territory who happen to be Indian.”  Id.  
at 251.  Biolsi’s “political geography is squarely centered in the map of the United States as a 
(multiracial) nation-state of equal citizens,” and the struggle taking place within it is part of “a 
larger struggle for inclusion in U.S. society, or for cultural citizenship—the right to be Indian and 
American at the same time in a truly multicultural society.”  Id. 
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select a slate of candidates who would then be put forward to enrolled tribal 
electors.  The problem of double voting could be solved by preventing 
enrolled Indian electors from voting for non-Indian representatives; any 
Indian could choose whether she wanted to be on the general electoral roll 
or the tribal roll.  This would also give tribal members, whether they live on 
or off a reservation, the option of aligning their political interests with their 
tribe or the general electorate.  However, the idea of a virtual nationwide 
election district, while avoiding many of the complexities of individual 
tribal election districts, would be novel challenging, and would require a 
constitutional amendment with all its attendant difficulties. 
Although amending the Constitution is a process that is  
time-consuming, expensive for proponents, and of uncertain outcome, the 
process holds out more promise than trying to stretch constitutional text to 
enable an adjustment in the federal structure to include tribes as co-equal 
sovereigns.  Of the proposals to amend the Constitution, only one emerges 
with some prospect of helping the tribes without weakening the federal 
structure, inviting political opposition, or creating divisions among tribes.  
And that is the creation of a virtual nationwide tribal election district.  But 
to call this a novel concept is an understatement. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
It is not easy to construct a solution to the problem of diminishing 
tribal sovereignty.  This article has tested the premise that the best answer 
lies in bringing tribes into the Constitution as co-equal sovereigns and thus 
into the governing process.  Approaches that arise outside the Constitution 
offer only temporary piecemeal solutions to an entrenched problem that has 
left tribes impoverished and powerless.  Still, locating solutions within the 
Constitution is extremely hard. 
The article has proposed several different solutions, including some 
that are under study in other countries with comparable indigenous 
populations.  Some solutions rely on creatively interpreting constitutional 
text; while others propose amending that text.  The article concludes that 
the amendment path, although difficult and time-consuming with no 
assurance of a favorable outcome, seems preferable to bleeding a preferred 
interpretation out of constitutional text. 
No proposal emerges unscathed from this discussion.  Some are too 
complex, others are likely to trigger fatal political opposition, and a few 
even threaten the Union’s stability.  Still others offer tribes little help, even 
if they could be implemented, or exacerbate differences among tribes or 
between reservation and urban Indians.  Only one approach holds any 
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promise: namely, the creation of a virtual nationwide tribal election district 
for all enrolled Indians who could elect seven representatives to serve as 
their representatives in Congress.  Although novel, Abele and Prince 
suggested a variant of it as a form of what they call “adapted federalism” as 
a way to enhance the sovereignty of their country’s First Nations.  The 
approach also passes muster under the four criteria proposed in this article; 
it would enhance tribal sovereignty without threatening the country’s 
stability or fracturing any political boundaries, be sufficiently inclusive of 
all Indians, and potentially be politically salient. 
It is imperative that tribes—the original occupants of this country—be 
given a place in the Constitution equal to that occupied by the states, not 
only for their survival as distinct political communities, but also for the 
survival of “the promise of democracy” that this country symbolizes.  The 
failure to do this “does not speak well of our political community . . . .”357  
Although this article has dreamt big in identifying possible solutions to the 
problem of diminished tribal sovereignty, its goal is much more modest:  
reinvigorating the effort to find a solution to the problem that so many 
others have identified. 
 
 
357.  Knight, supra note 66, at 113 (“It does not speak well of our political community that 
the first peoples of this country have been denied a proportionate place in Parliament . . . Indeed, 
until Aboriginal people are included in reasonable numbers in the body that chooses governments 
and shapes policies, it is not inappropriate to suggest that, for many, Canada will have failed to 
live up to the promise of democracy.”). 
